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1 
PISTOL WHIPPED: BASELESS LAWSUITS, 
FOOLISH LAWS* 
Robert A. Levy** 
INTRODUCTION 
Although Congress and the majority of state legislatures have 
resisted enacting draconian gun control laws, courts are the final 
bulwark in safeguarding our constitutional right to keep and bear 
arms. Yet the courtroom has become the scene of unprecedented 
attacks as gun control advocates have used the judiciary to make 
an end-run around the legislative process. Meritless litigation 
brought by government plaintiffs in multiple jurisdictions are just 
part of a scheme to force gun makers to adopt policies that legis-
latures have wisely rejected. Moreover, the politicians use these 
suits to reward their allies—private attorneys who are often major 
                                                          
 * For an earlier version of this article, see Robert A. Levy, Pistol 
Whipped: Baseless Lawsuits, Foolish Laws, CATO POL’Y ANALYSIS, NO. 2, 
May 9, 2001. This article raises several issues addressed by the author in pre-
viously published material that has been adapted for inclusion here. See Robert 
A. Levy, Blackmail of Gun Makers, NAT’L. LAW J., Jan. 31, 2000, at A20; 
Robert A. Levy, Clinton, Gore and a Million More, WASH. TIMES, May 12, 
2000, at A20; Robert A. Levy, The Great Tobacco Robbery, LEGAL TIMES, 
Feb. 1, 1999, at 27; Robert A. Levy, Turning Lead into Gold, LEGAL TIMES, 
Aug. 23, 1999, at 21; Robert A. Levy, When Theft Masquerades as Law, 
22(2) CATO POL’Y REP. 1 (2000); Michael I. Krauss & Robert A. Levy, So 
Sue Them, Sue Them: Cities Look to Squeeze Gun Makers, WKLY. STANDARD, 
May 24, 1999, at 19. 
 ** Senior fellow in constitutional studies at the Cato Institute; Adjunct 
Professor at the Georgetown University Law Center; Director for the Institute 
for Justice, and Trustee of The Objectivist Center; Ph.D. in Business from 
American University; J.D. from George Mason University. 
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campaign contributors. 
Meanwhile, many of the same politicians have exploited a 
few recent tragedies to promote their anti-gun agenda. Those 
politicians advocate gun control measures that have not been and 
will not be effective. In fact, many of the recommended regula-
tions will make matters worse by stripping law-abiding citizens of 
their most effective means of self-defense. Violence in America 
is not due to the availability of guns, but instead to social path-
ologies, such as illegitimacy, dysfunctional schools, and sub-
stance abuse.1 Historically, more gun laws have gone hand-in-
hand with an explosion of violent crime. Over the past decade—
because of vigorous law enforcement, a booming economy, and 
an older population—there has been a dramatic reduction in vio-
lence, coupled with a record number of guns in circulation. 
Despite those convincing statistics, during the summer of 
1999 the Clinton administration threatened gun makers—already 
engulfed by a torrent of litigation from dozens of cities—with ad-
ditional claims from more than 3000 public housing authorities 
coordinated by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment (“HUD”).2 While under President Bush, further action 
by HUD will almost certainly be shelved,3 the ongoing city- and 
                                                          
1 NAACP head Kweisi Mfume acknowledges that there are “pathologies 
in any society that contribute to violence,” for example, teenage pregnancy, 
dysfunctional schools, drug and alcohol abuse, and a welfare system that sub-
sidizes illegitimacy and unemployment. Draft of an Open Letter from John R. 
Lott, Jr., Senior Research Scholar, Yale University Law School, to Members 
of Congress (June 3, 1999) (on file with author). 
2 See Paul M. Barrett, HUD May Join Assault on Gun Makers, WALL ST. 
J., July 28, 1999, at A3 [hereinafter Barrett, HUD May Join Assault]. HUD 
was “established in 1965 to coordinate and administer programs that provide 
assistance for housing and community development.” COLUMBIA 
ENCYCLOPEDIA (6th ed. 2001), available at http://www.bartleby.com. The 
department assists in funding solutions to the problems of housing and urban 
development through state, local, or private action. Id. 
3 See James Dao, The Nation: Over a Barrel; New Gun Control Politics: 
A Whimper, Not a Bang, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2001, at 4. “[T]he election of 
President Bush, a long-time ally of the N.R.A., put a towering obstacle to gun 
control legislation in the White House. As governor of Texas, he signed laws 
making it legal to carry concealed weapons and difficult for cities to sue gun 
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state-sponsored lawsuits could destroy the firearms industry, with 
profound implications for the rule of law and the Constitution. 
The government’s resort to litigation as a tactic of intimidation 
and extortion will have destructive consequences extending far 
beyond a single industry. 
The current avalanche of lawsuits against gun makers began 
unfolding in June of 1997.4 At that time, the giant tobacco com-
                                                          
manufacturers.” Id. 
4 The city, county and state lawsuits include, in chronological order by 
filing date: New Orleans, LA (Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 98-
18578 Div. M (Parish of Orleans Civ. Dist. Ct. filed Oct. 30, 1998)); Chi-
cago/Cook County, IL (Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 98-CHI15596 
(Cook County Cir. Ct. filed Nov. 12, 1998)); Bridgeport, CT (Ganim v. Smith 
& Wesson Corp., No. 06-CV-99-01531988 (Conn. Super. Ct. filed Jan. 27, 
1999)); Miami-Dade County, FL (Penelas v. Arms Tech, Inc., No. 99-01941-
CA-06 (11th Cir. Ct. Miami-Dade County filed Jan. 27, 1999)); Atlanta, GA 
(Atlanta v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 99-VS-0149217J (Fulton County Ct. 
filed Feb. 5, 1999)); Cleveland, OH (White v. Hi-Points Firearms, No. CV-
99-381897 (Cuyahoga County C.P. filed Apr. 8, 1999)); Detroit, MI (Archer 
v. Arms Tech., Inc., No. 99-912-658-NZ (Wayne County Cir. Ct. filed Apr. 
26, 1999)); Wayne County, MI (McNamara v. Arms Tech., Inc., No. 99-912-
662-NZ (Wayne County Cir. Ct. filed Apr. 26, 1999)); Cincinnati, OH (Cin-
cinnati v. Beretta U.S. A. Corp., No. A-99023169 (Ohio Ct. C.P. filed Apr. 
28, 1999)); St. Louis, MO (St. Louis v. Cernicek, No. CV-992-01209 (St. 
Louis Cir. Ct. filed Apr. 30, 1999)); Alameda County, Berkeley, East Palo 
Alto, Oakland, Sacramento, San Francisco and San Mateo County, CA (Peo-
ple v. Arcadia Mach. & Tool, Inc., No. 303753 (S.F. Super Ct. filed May 25, 
1999)); Compton, Englewood, Los Angeles and West Hollywood, CA (People 
v. Arcadia Mach. & Tool, Inc., No. BC-210894 (L.A. Super Ct. filed May 
25, 1999)); Camden County, NJ (Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders 
v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 99-CV-2518 (D.N.J. filed June 1, 1999)); Bos-
ton, MA (Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 99-VS-0149217J (Suffolk 
County Super. Ct. filed June 3, 1999)); Newark, NJ (James v. Arcadia Mach. 
& Tool, Inc., No. ESX-L-6059-99 (Essex County Super. Ct. filed June 21, 
1999)); Camden, NJ (Camden v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 451099 (Camden 
County Super. Ct. filed June 21, 1999)); Los Angeles County, CA (People v. 
Arcadia Mach. & Tool, Inc., No. BC-214794 (L.A. Super. Ct. filed Aug. 6, 
1999)); Gary, IN (Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 45D029908-CT-355 
(Lake Super. Ct. filed Aug. 27, 1999)); Wilmington, DE (Sills v. Smith & 
Wesson Corp., No. 99-C-09283 (New Castle County Super. Ct. filed Sept. 
29, 1999)); Washington, D.C. (D.C .v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 00-
0000428 (D.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 20, 2000)); New York, NY (New York City v. 
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panies first caved in to the state Medicaid recovery suits.5 Ciga-
rette manufacturers, besieged by claims in dozens of states and 
sued under perverted rules of tort law that eliminated any oppor-
tunity for an adequate defense,6 decided to settle. In other words, 
the companies decided to bribe the politicians instead of going to 
war against a punitive money grab. That capitulation—the sur-
render of the industry’s right to market a perfectly legal pro-
duct—predictably spawned a new round of litigation. This time, 
gun makers were pitted against the combined resources of bil-
lionaire trial lawyers, city mayors, county executives, a state at-
torney general, and the Clinton administration. 
In bullying gun makers, the plaintiffs have included three cor-
rosive ingredients carried over from the tobacco wars in their 
litigation formula: First, they have sued in multiple jurisdictions, 
thereby escalating the industry’s legal costs. Second, they have 
employed contingency fee lawyers, many of whom were major 
political donors. Third, they have tried to use the judicial branch 
in order to bypass the legislature. Contrary to the plaintiffs’ ar-
guments that those efforts will reduce gun violence, compelling 
statistics suggest otherwise—that fewer guns in our society would 
leave Americans more, not less vulnerable to gun violence. 
In Part I of this article, I examine that new litigation para-
                                                          
Arms Tech., Inc., No. 00 CV (E.D.N.Y. filed June 20, 2000); New York State 
v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., No. 402586 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County filed June 26, 
2000)). 
5 “[G]iven the perverse legal rules under which the state Medicaid recov-
ery suits were unfolding, the cigarette giants were effectively bludgeoned into 
negotiating with the states and the trial lawyers.” See Robert A. Levy, Joel 
Klein’s Legacy: The Mother of All Antitrust Violations, CATO: TODAY’S 
COMMENTARY, Oct. 7, 2000. A Master Settlement Agreement, signed in Nov-
ember 1998 by the major tobacco companies and forty-six state attorneys gen-
eral, includes a provision requiring non-signing cigarette manufacturers to post 
pro-rata damages on sales in escrow for twenty-five years to offset any poten-
tial liability. Id. 
6 See Robert A. Levy, Tobacco Medicaid Litigation: Snuffing out the Rule 
of Law, CATO POL’Y ANALYSIS, NO. 275, June 20, 1997 [hereinafter, Levy, 
Tobacco Medicaid Litigation] (noting that in the thirty-nine suits brought 
against the tobacco industry, the states have circumvented the rules of 
subrogation and have sued the manufacturers directly). 
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digm. In Part II, I digress briefly to explore Second Amendment 
concerns. In Part III, I analyze the suits threatened by public 
housing authorities, the claims by some cities that gun makers are 
responsible for “negligent marketing,” the allegation by other cit-
ies that guns are an “unreasonably dangerous” and “defective” 
product, and the fallout from the Smith & Wesson settlement. Fi-
nally, in Part IV, I assess the data that allegedly links gun inju-
ries and crime to gun ownership, and I conclude that the data in 
fact shows an inverse correlation—i.e., high gun ownership leads 
to fewer gun injuries and crimes—lending further support to the 
notion that these lawsuits are entirely meritless. 
I.  STATE-SPONSORED TORT SUITS: THE NEW PARADIGM 
When public officials prosecute lawbreakers, those officials 
are fulfilling a legitimate role of government. Most of the time, 
that prosecutorial role is unobjectionable, often commendable. 
But the latest rounds of litigation dealing with tobacco and then 
guns are different in three respects, each of which threatens the 
rule of law. 
First, coordinated actions by multiple government entities can 
impose enormous legal fees on defendants.7 As a result, those ac-
tions have been used to extort money notwithstanding that the 
underlying case is without merit.8 For example, former Philadel-
                                                          
7 See Robert A. Levy, Spoils of the Tobacco Shakedown: Contingent-Fee 
Contracts Between State and Private Attorneys Should Be Illegal, TX. LAW, 
Feb. 15, 1999, at 23 [hereinafter Levy, Spoils of the Tobacco Shakedown]. 
“The private attorneys who represented Florida, Texas, and Mississippi in 
litigation against the tobacco industry have made out like bandits, fleecing to-
bacco companies, smokers, and taxpayers. In December, arbitration panels 
awarded the lawyers $8.2 billion in legal fees.” Id.; see also All Things Con-
sidered: Tobacco Settlement Attorneys’ Fees (NPR radio broadcast, Sept. 25, 
2001) (reporting that the “law firms who helped secure Michigan’s share of 
the settlement are due $450 million”). 
8 Legal commentators, newspaper columnists, and editors alike have used 
the term “extortion” when discussing and describing suits initiated by cities, 
states, and the federal government in an effort to target socially unpopular de-
fendants. See, e.g., Robert A. Levy, The New Business of Government Spon-
sored Litigation, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 592, 593 (2000) [hereinafter 
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phia Mayor Edward G. Rendell (D) called for dozens of cities to 
file concurrent suits against gun makers.9 Gun manufacturers 
“don’t have the deep pockets of the tobacco industry,” Rendell 
explained, and multiple lawsuits “could bring them to the nego-
tiating table a lot sooner.”10 Never mind that the suits are base-
less. We are not dealing with law, but with extortion parading as 
law. 
One effective way to stop that thievery is to implement a 
“government pays” rule granting a defendant’s legal fees when a 
governmental unit is the losing plaintiff in a civil case. In the 
criminal sphere, defendants are already entitled to court-
appointed counsel if needed;11 they are also protected by the re-
quirement for proof beyond reasonable doubt and by the Fifth 
and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution.12 No corresponding 
safeguards against abusive public sector litigation exist in civil 
cases. By limiting the rule to cases involving government plain-
tiffs, access to the courts is preserved for less affluent, private 
plaintiffs seeking redress of legitimate grievances. As a result, 
defendants in government suits will be able to resist meritless 
cases brought by the state solely to ratchet up the pressure for a 
large financial settlement. 
“Government pays” becomes ever more urgent with the re-
cent emergence of an insidious relationship between the plain-
tiffs’ bar and some government officials. That relationship com-
                                                          
Levy, The New Business]; James Bandler, Under the Gun, BOSTON GLOBE, 
May 9, 1999 (Magazine), at 10; Christopher Gillott, Federal Tobacco Lawsuit 
Ploy to Steal Companies’ Money, DAILY COLLEGIAN, Oct. 4, 1999; George 
Will, Extortion Holds a Nation Hostage, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 26, 2000, at 
21. 
9 See, e.g., Fox Butterfield, New Orleans Seeks Millions in Gun Suit, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1998, at A16; New Legal Target: Cities Plan to Sue Gun 
Makers over Cost of Crimes, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 1998, at A07; Peter 
Nicholas, Philadelphia Mayor Has New Plan for Battle Against Gun Industry, 
THE PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 31, 1998; Roberto Suro, Cities Plan Legal As-
sault on Makers of Handguns; Tobacco Lawsuits Viewed as Model, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 23, 1998, at A01. 
10 See Butterfield, supra note 9, at A16. 
11 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
12 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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mon to tobacco and gun litigation is a second major threat to the 
rule of law. 
The rounds of litigation against both the tobacco and gun in-
dustries were concocted by a handful of private attorneys who en-
tered into contingency fee contracts with the government.13 In ef-
fect, members of the private bar were hired as government 
subcontractors with a huge financial share in the outcome. 
Rendell—not believing this to be a problem—announced that cit-
ies were suing gun makers for the purposes of improving safety 
features and changing distribution practices, not for the purpose 
of receiving monetary damages.14 Yet one day after Rendell’s 
disclaimer, Miami and Bridgeport filed their suits, seeking hun-
dreds of millions of dollars in damages.15 New Orleans asked for 
damages,16 as did Chicago to the tune of $433 million.17 The 
claims included not only medical costs associated with gun vio-
lence, but also the costs of police protection, emergency services, 
police overtime and pensions, courts, prisons, loss of population, 
cleaning the streets of blood, lower property values, even lost tax 
revenue from reduced worker productivity18—plus punitive dam-
ages. And nearly all of the cities have solicited private lawyers to 
                                                          
13 See Levy, Spoils of the Tobacco Shakedown, supra note 7, at 23; Levy, 
Tobacco Medicaid Litigation, supra note 7 (stating that attorneys involved in 
the tobacco litigations in Florida, Texas, and Mississippi were awarded $8.2 
billion in legal fees). 
14 See Nicholas, supra note 9 (asserting that lawsuits filed against gun 
manufacturers sought to recover costs from gun violence). 
15 See Gail Appleson, Two More Cities Sue Gun Makers, WASH. POST, 
Jan. 28, 1999, at A6. 
16 See Butterfield, supra note 9, at A16. 
17 Chicago Mayor Richard M. Daley, Remarks at Press Conference (Nov. 
12, 1998). 
18 See, e.g., Appleson, supra note 15, at A6; Susan Kimmelman, Stick 
‘Em Up: Suing Gunmakers for the Cost of Urban Violence, IN THESE TIMES, 
July 26, 1998, at 13. In 1996 David Kairys, a law professor at Temple Uni-
versity, worked with civic leaders in Philadelphia to craft a lawsuit basing 
damages on gun cost in terms of police, emergency personnel, public health, 
courts and prisons. Id. “Kairys writes, ‘A city’s potential damages can begin 
with a 911 call, cleaning blood from the street, and emergency medical care, 
and continue through support of an orphaned child.’” Id. 
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work for a contingency fee based on those damages.19 
If money is not the primary goal of such litigation, a number 
of attorneys will have worked for free. Maybe that is fitting. Af-
ter all, the gun suits are not intended to go to trial. HUD’s 
threat—on top of the city and county claims—was meant to pro-
mote a settlement, not a trial.20 No doubt, with a piddling $1.5 
billion in annual revenues,21 gun makers are not going to yield 
the same treasure trove as the tobacco behemoths whose world-
wide sales are $300 billion.22 A comparatively small payoff is not 
fatal, however. The real goal of the trial lawyers is to chalk up 
one more victory, thus demonstrating to future fatter-cat defen-
dants that groundless legal theories are good enough when the 
coercive power of multiple government entities is arrayed against 
an unpopular industry. 
When a private lawyer subcontracts his services to the gov-
ernment, he bears the same responsibility as a government law-
yer.23 He is a public servant beholden to all citizens, including 
the defendant, and his overriding objective is to seek justice. 
Imagine a state attorney paid a contingency fee for each indict-
                                                          
19 See, e.g., Kimmelman, supra note 18, at 13 (stating that Kairys, 
among others, was urged by civic leaders and Philadelphia’s mayor to develop 
a lawsuit against gun manufactures on behalf of the city); Stuart Taylor, Jr., 
Guns and Tobacco: Government by Litigation, NAT’L J., Mar. 25, 2000, 
available at 2000 WL 6436955 (stating gun lawsuits were bankrolled by con-
tingent-fee lawyers). 
20 See John Riley, Cuomo’s Stepping-stone/ HUD Position Was a Plat-
form for His Political Career, NEWSDAY, Aug. 23, 2001, available at 2001 
WL 9246991 (stating that HUD secretary Cuomo used the threat of a federal 
class-action lawsuit against gun makers in order to influence them to settle 
cases with states and cities). 
21 See Paul M. Barrett, Jumping the Gun? Attacks on Firearms Echo Ear-
lier Assaults on Tobacco Industry, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 1999, at A1. 
22 Lung Association Calls on the Bush Administration to Strengthen 
Global Tobacco Control Treaty, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Mar. 7, 2001 (“[W]orld-
wide sales of cigarettes reach[ed] $295.8 billion in 1996.”). 
23 See John M. Burman, Special Ethical Duties of Government Lawyers, 
23 OCT. WYO. LAW. 14, 14 (2000) (arguing that government lawyers, includ-
ing those contracted to represent the government, are bound by the same ethi-
cal standards as lawyers in private practice). 
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ment that he secures, or a state trooper paid per speeding ticket. 
The potential for corruption is enormous. Still, the states doled 
out multi-billion dollar contracts to private counsel in their to-
bacco suits.24 Those contracts did not call for per-hour fees, 
which might occasionally be justified to acquire unique outside 
competence or experience, but contingency fees, a sure-fire cata-
lyst for abuse of power.25 Moreover, the contracts were awarded 
without competitive bidding to lawyers who often bankrolled 
state political campaigns.26 Put bluntly, contingency fee contracts 
between government and a private attorney should be illegal. We 
cannot in a free society condone private lawyers enforcing public 
law with an incentive kicker to increase the penalties. 
Government is the single entity authorized, in narrowly de-
fined circumstances, to wield coercive power against private citi-
zens. When that government functions as prosecutor or plaintiff 
in a legal proceeding in which it also dispenses punishment, ade-
quate safeguards against state misbehavior are essential. For that 
reason, we rely primarily on private remedies with redress 
sought by and for the benefit of the injured party and not the state 
in civil litigation. As the Supreme Court cautioned more than 
sixty years ago, an attorney for the state “is the representative 
not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty 
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its ob-
                                                          
24 See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (discussing these multi-
billion dollar contracts to private counsel). 
25 Plaintiffs’ lawyers hired by the state have an inherent conflict. Because 
they represent the state, their goal should be to seek justice. Because they may 
potentially receive a huge payoff due to the contingency arrangement, plain-
tiffs’ attorneys cannot impartially evaluate a settlement agreement. Addition-
ally, there is little justification for states to pay large contingency fees to those 
attorneys when states have salaried attorneys on staff. See Levy, Tobacco 
Medicaid Litigation, supra note 6; see also Carolyn Lochhead, The Growing 
Power of Trial Lawyers, WKLY. STANDARD, Sept. 23, 1996, at 21 (arguing 
that, because trial lawyers are “bankrolling politicians at a level unmatched by 
any profession,” there exists a “blatant conflict of interest [inasmuch as] a 
number of state prosecutors are handing out these multibillion-dollar con-
tracts . . . to the same lawyers who donate money to their campaigns”). 
26 See Lochhead, supra note 25, at 21. 
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ligation to govern at all.”27 
Third, and perhaps most important, laws are supposed to be 
enacted by legislatures, not by the executive or judicial 
branches.28 In too many instances, government-sponsored litiga-
tion has been a substitute for failed legislation. That process vio-
lates the principle of separation of powers—a centerpiece of the 
federal constitution and no less important at the state level.29 Evi-
dently, some attorneys general, mayors, and their allies in the 
private bar are not concerned with that violation. In an attempt to 
circumvent the legislative process, they intend to pursue through 
litigation what was rejected by the legislature. 
An interesting contrast can be drawn between legal perspec-
tives on product prohibition prevailing in 1919 and those prevail-
ing now. In 1919, because Congress did not have the power to 
prohibit the sale of alcohol,30 prohibition was accomplished by a 
constitutional amendment.31 Today, the drug war is entirely statu-
tory32 with little thought of its constitutional implications. When 
                                                          
27 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
28 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; art. II, § 3; see also Taylor v. Johnson, 
961 P.2d 768 (N.M. 1998) (holding that the state Constitution grants exclu-
sively to the legislative branch the power to enact new laws and amend exist-
ing laws). 
29 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; art. II, § 3; see also Wayman v. Southard, 
23 U.S. 1 (1825) (determining that the law is made by the legislative branch, 
executed by the executive branch, and construed by the judicial branch). 
30 48 C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquors §§ 21-22 (1984) (noting that the right to 
regulate or prohibit the sale or manufacture of alcoholic beverages rested ex-
clusively in the states prior to the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment to 
the Constitution). 
31 U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. 
XXI. “[T]he manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors 
within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United 
States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes 
is hereby prohibited.” Id. 
32 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 844 (making simple possession of controlled 
substances unlawful and establishing penalties); 21 U.S.C. § 841 (making 
manufacture, distribution and dispensing controlled substances or intent to do 
so unlawful and establishing penalties); 21 U.S.C. § 878 (giving Drug En-
forcement Administration personnel and certain state and local law enforce-
ment officers power to conduct searches, seize controlled substances, and 
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it came to tobacco, the Clinton administration argued not only do 
we not need a constitutional amendment, we also do not need a 
statute.33 Instead, according to the administration, we only need a 
delegation of some sort to an unelected administrative agency, 
the Food and Drug Administration, with authority to ban nico-
tine.34 And in the case of guns, some feel that we do not need a 
constitutional amendment, a statute, or a delegation. Instead, we 
only need multiple lawsuits as a means for the executive branch 
to bypass the legislature and effectuate a variety of gun prohibi-
tions.35 So much for limited government and separation of pow-
ers. We are left with the executive state—a modern-day return of 
the king. 
Under that regime, dozens of cities, aided by the Clinton ad-
ministration, took the gun battle to the courts—suing gun makers 
for “negligently marketing” a “defective product.”36 Before fur-
ther discussing those lawsuits, however, a quick but important 
detour—an examination of the debate surrounding the Second 
Amendment—is warranted. 
II.  TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS 
At the same time that cities were suing the gun industry, a 
Texas appeals court was reviewing a lower court decision that 
                                                          
make arrests). 
33 See Cable News Network, President Declares Nicotine Addictive (Aug. 
23, 1996), at http://www.cnn.com/US/9608/23/clinton.tobacco.update. Clin-
ton, instead of supporting a constitutional amendment or a federal statute, at-
tempted to bring nicotine under the control of the Food and Drug Administra-
tion in approving federal regulations that declared nicotine an addictive drug. 
Id. 
34 Id. 
35 See, e.g., David Kairys, The Governmental Handgun Cases and the 
Elements and Underlying Policies of Public Nuisance Law, 32 CONN. L. REV. 
1175 (2000) (considering public nuisance litigation claims by local government 
executives against gun manufacturers as an effective means to curb prolifera-
tion of gun sales). 
36 See supra note 4 (listing the suits brought against gun manufacturers by 
various cities). 
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invalidated a federal statute on Second Amendment grounds.37 It 
examined the questions of whether the Second Amendment se-
cures an individual right to keep and bear arms and, if it does, 
what restrictions governments can place on its exercise. The 
court’s answers to those questions could determine future legisla-
tion directed at stricter gun control. 
The text of the Second Amendment reads as follows: “A well 
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, 
the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be in-
fringed.”38 The question that seems to have perplexed the Su-
preme Court for more than two-hundred years is whether the 
right to keep and bear arms, as laid out in the Second Amend-
ment, belongs to each of us as individuals or to us collectively as 
members of the militia. One approach to resolving that question 
is to compare the text of the Second Amendment with the texts of 
the First and Fourth Amendments. 
The Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth Amend-
ments, refers explicitly to “the right of the people.” No reason-
able person can doubt that First Amendment rights—speech, re-
ligion, assembly, and redress of grievances39—belong to us as 
individuals. Similarly, Fourth Amendment protections against un-
reasonable searches and seizures are individual rights.40 We se-
cure “the right of the people” by guaranteeing the right of each 
person. In the context of the Second Amendment, it does not pro-
                                                          
37 United States v. Emerson, No. 99-10331, 2001 WL 1230757, at *7 
(5th Cir. Oct. 16, 2001). 
38 U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
39 U.S. CONST. amend. I. “Congress shall make no law respecting an es-
tablishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people to peaceably 
to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” Id. 
40 U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV. 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Id. 
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tect the state, but each individual against the state—that is, the 
amendment is a deterrent to government tyranny.41 
Some would insist that although the threat of tyrannical gov-
ernment has not disappeared, it is less today than when our re-
public was experiencing its birth pangs.42 Perhaps so. Tyranny 
may be a lesser threat now, but incompetence by the state in de-
fending its citizens against criminals is a greater threat. The de-
mand for police to defend us increases in proportion to our in-
ability to defend ourselves. For that reason, disarmed societies 
tend to become police states. Witness law abiding inner city resi-
dents, many of whom have been disarmed by gun control, beg-
ging for police protection against drug gangs despite the terrible 
violations of civil liberties that such protection entails, such as 
curfews, anti-loitering laws, civil asset forfeiture, even non-
consensual searches of public housing. 
Even if a reduced threat of government tyranny were to no 
longer require an armed citizenry, an unarmed citizenry could 
well create the conditions that lead to tyranny. The right to bear 
arms is thus prophylactic rather than remedial. It reduces the de-
mand for a police state. George Washington University law pro-
fessor Robert Cottrol puts it this way: “A people incapable of 
protecting themselves will lose their rights as a free people, be-
coming either servile dependents of the state or of the criminal 
predators who are their de facto masters.”43 Indeed, after the 
atrocities of September 11, 2001, we learned that the state cannot 
                                                          
41 Government tyranny occurs when a government attempts to tell its peo-
ple how to think, write, and pray. See John W. Bissel, Bench Opinion on the 
Second Amendment, 10 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 807, 810 (2000). 
42 See Bissel, supra note 41, at 810-11. 
The protection of the States’ freedom and security from central gov-
ernment tyranny was a critical consideration for the drafters of the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. . . . we have had our modern 
counterparts . . . [however, the] critical underpinning of the Second 
Amendment permits legislatures [t]o preserve the security of a State 
and its citizens. 
Bissel, supra note 41. 
43 Robert J. Cottrol, Gun Control is Racist, Sexist, & Classist, AM. 
ENTER., Sept. 1, 1999, at 60. 
LEVYMACRO2-20.DOC 2/22/02 4:26 PM 
14 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
defend its citizens against all acts of terror. It is imperative, 
therefore, that we are able to defend ourselves. 
More than sixty years ago the Supreme Court looked at the 
question of an individual right or collective right in United States 
v. Miller.44 Miller involved the 1934 National Firearms Act, 
which required registration of machine guns, sawed off rifles, 
sawed off shotguns, and silencers.45 In addressing the text of the 
Second Amendment, the Court viewed “militia” as a term of art 
meaning “the body of the people capable of bearing arms.”46 
That suggests a right belonging to all of us as individuals. The 
Court also held, however, that the right to bear arms extended 
only to weapons rationally related to the militia and not the sawed 
off shotgun at issue in Miller.47 
That mixed ruling has puzzled legal scholars for six dec-
ades.48 If military use is the decisive test, one would think that 
today’s citizens can possess rocket launchers, missiles, even nu-
clear arms. Obviously, that is not what the Court had in mind. 
Because the Court’s opinion in Miller is so murky, argues 
George Mason University law professor Nelson Lund, maybe the 
only lesson we can draw is that the case must be interpreted nar-
rowly, allowing restrictions on those types of weapons covered 
                                                          
44 United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). In that case, defendants 
Jack Miller and Frank Layton were charged with unlawfully transporting a 
double barrel 12-guage shotgun across state lines from Oklahoma to Arkansas 
in violation of the National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. § 1132 (1934). Id. at 
175. 
45 26 U.S.C. § 1132 (1934). 
46 Miller, 307 U.S. at 179. 
47 Id. at 178. 
48 See, e.g., Christopher Chrisman, Constitutional Structure and the Sec-
ond Amendment: A Defense of the Individual Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 43 
ARIZ. L. REV. 439, 441 (2001) (considering the meaning of U.S. v. Miller to 
be “less than clear”); Nelson Lund, Outsider Voices on Guns and the Consti-
tution, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 701, 703 (2000) (arguing that the Supreme 
Court’s decision was “lazy and ambiguous”). Kevin T. Streit, Can Congress 
Regulate Firearms?: Printz v. United States and the Intersection of the Com-
merce Clause, the Tenth Amendment, and the Second Amendment, 7 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 645, 662 (1999) (“United States v. Miller, which, like the 
Second Amendment itself, was far from a model of clarity.”). 
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by the 1934 Act—weapons like machine guns and silencers, 
which have slight value to law abiding citizens, and high value to 
criminals.49 
Apparently, a few renowned, liberal law professors are now 
taking that position. In a famous 1989 article, “The Embarrassing 
Second Amendment,” Professor Sanford Levinson became the 
first prominent liberal to acknowledge that the Second Amend-
ment should be treated as something more than an inkblot.50 Evi-
dently, the liberal apostasy has caught on. Harvard professor 
Laurence Tribe and Yale professor Akhil Amar concede that 
there is an individual right to keep and bear arms, albeit limited 
as in Miller by “reasonable regulation in the interest of public 
safety.”51 
In effect, those scholars argue that the Second Amendment, 
like the First Amendment, is not absolute.52 “Reasonable” re-
strictions—for example, on the types of weapons that can be pur-
chased—may be justified on cost-benefit grounds. On the other 
hand, Tribe and Amar imply that the Fourteenth Amendment 
binds the states, not just the federal government, to honor the 
Second Amendment.53 In that respect, the two professors go far-
ther than our federal appellate courts, which have taken a states 
rights approach to the Second Amendment, rubber-stamping state 
gun prohibitions without subjecting them to rigorous constitu-
                                                          
49 See Nelson Lund, The Ends of Second Amendment Jurisprudence: Fire-
arms Disabilities and Domestic Violence Restraining Orders, 4 TEX. REV. L. 
& POL. 157, 171 (1999) [hereinafter Lund, The Ends of Second Amendment 
Jurisprudence]. 
50 See Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE 
L.J. 637, 658 (1989) (arguing that the Second Amendment should “enter full 
scale into the consciousness of the legal academy” and be taken seriously in 
constitutional discussions). 
51 Laurence H. Tribe & Akhil Reed Amar, Well-Regulated Militias, and 
More, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1999, at A31. 
52 Id. at 31 (“[I]t has been a terrible mistake for both sides in the gun con-
trol controversy to insist that the Second Amendment bans virtually everything 
or virtually nothing.”). 
53 Id. (stating that the Fourth Amendment, “which makes part of the Bill 
of Rights applicable to the states, reflect[s] a broad agreement that bearing 
arms was a ‘privilege’ of each citizen”). 
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tional scrutiny.54 
That difference between federal and state treatment is impor-
tant in repudiating an argument frequently raised by anti-gun ad-
vocates—that the framers did not intend the Second Amendment 
to bestow individual rights. For example, the Center to Prevent 
Handgun Violence argues that when our nation was founded, 
many states had communal storage of guns and restricted their 
use to white males only.55 Pointing to the facts that Maryland ac-
tually seized guns that were not used in the militia and Pennsyl-
vania denied firearms to 40% of its citizens for lack of virtue, the 
Center concludes that the framers could not have intended an in-
dividual right to keep and bear arms.56 That argument, however, 
has a missing link. Until 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment 
was ratified, the Bill of Rights constrained only the federal gov-
ernment. What the states did prior to that time is not directly 
relevant from a constitutional perspective. 
With that background in mind, let us turn to an important 
case in Lubbock, Texas, United States v. Emerson,57 recently de-
cided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. In af-
firming the lower court’s “individual rights” model of the Second 
Amendment, the Fifth Circuit became the only federal appellate 
court to reject unequivocally all varieties of the “collective 
rights” model.58 Judge William L. Garwood’s comprehensive and 
                                                          
54 See, e.g., Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98, 103 (9th Cir. 1996) (dismiss-
ing plaintiff’s Second Amendment challenge to California’s concealed firearm 
statute for lack of standing and declining to discuss the merits of the underly-
ing case); Quilici v. Martin Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 269-70 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(holding that any restriction the Second Amendment may place on the federal 
government does not apply to the states). 
55 For a specific analysis of the Center’s approach to the framer’s intent 
of a “well-regulated militia,” see Center for Prevention of Handgun Violence, 
The Myth of the Second Amendment, at http://www.bradycampaign.org/ 
facts/issuebriefs/second.asp (last visited Nov. 10, 2001). 
56 See Rachana Bhowmik, Our Second Amendment Rights Are Not 
Eroded: Our Understanding of Them, However, Is, CHURCH & SOC’Y, 
May/June 2000, at 49. 
57 No. 99-10331, 2001 WL 1230757, at *7 (5th Cir. Oct. 16, 2001). 
58 Id. at 601-02. Here, the court rejects the notion that the framers had a 
“collective rights” purpose in mind when drafting the Second Amendment. 
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scholarly opinion said that the Constitution “protects the right of 
individuals, including those not then actually a member of any 
militia or engaged in active military service or training, to pri-
vately possess or bear their own firearms . . . that are suitable as 
personal individual weapons.”59 
In Texas, like many other states, spouses involved in divorce 
proceedings can be placed under a court order restraining them 
from harassing, stalking, or threatening their partner.60 A federal 
statute makes it illegal for anyone under that type of restraining 
order to possess a gun.61 Mr. Emerson was indicted under the 
federal statute, and he contested his indictment on Second 
Amendment grounds.62 In April 1999 a federal judge dismissed 
the indictment, agreeing with Emerson that the statute violated 
the Second Amendment.63 
                                                          
Specifically, in observing the “plain language” of the amendment, the court 
finds that textually, “if the amendment truly meant what collective rights ad-
vocates propose, then the text would read, ‘a well regulated militia, being nec-
essary to the security of a free state and the right of the States to keep and bear 
Arms, shall not be infringed.’” Id. at 601 (alteration in original). Further, in 
its historical analysis of the Second Amendment, the court states that the indi-
vidual right to bear arms was “a right recognized in both England and the 
colonies,” and was a “crucial factor in the colonists’ victory over the British 
army in the Revolutionary War.” Id. at 603. After declaring independence and 
establishing a new government through the Constitution, the “American foun-
ders sought to codify the individual right to bear arms, as did their forbears 
one hundred years earlier in the English Bill of rights.” Id. 
59 Id. at 37. 
60 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.501 (2000). 
61 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(B), (9) (2001). The statute provides that it is 
unlawful for any person who is subject to a court order restraining “such per-
son from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of such person 
or child of such intimate partner or person, or engaging in other conduct that 
would place an intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the part-
ner or child” to possess any firearm or ammunition. Id. 
62 United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598, 599 (1999). Mr. Emer-
son claimed a personal right to bear arms under the Second Amendment, and 
also challenged his indictment on other constitutional grounds, including the 
Commerce Clause, the Fifth Amendment, and the Tenth Amendment. Id. at 
599. 
63 Id. at 614. 
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The trial judge, Samuel Cummings, did not equivocate. He 
said, “If the amendment truly meant what the collective rights 
advocates propose, then the text would read, ‘A well regulated 
Militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of 
the states [or the militia] to keep and bear arms shall not be in-
fringed.’”64 Cummings might have added that a collective right, 
if conferred on the states, would permit “state governments [to] 
maintain military organizations independent from the federal 
military, and to arm those organizations with nuclear weapons or 
whatever else the state may choose.”65 A states’ rights approach 
would also suggest that “Supreme Court decisions recognizing 
that the federal government has final authority over the deploy-
ment and use of the National Guard must be incorrect.”66 
When Cummings parsed the two clauses of the Second 
Amendment, he concluded that “[t]he function of the subordinate 
clause was not to qualify the right, but instead to show why it 
must be protected. . . . If this right were not protected, the exis-
tence of the militia, and consequently the security of the state, 
would be jeopardized.”67 In other words, the second clause (“the 
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be in-
fringed”) is operational; it secures the right. The first clause (“A 
well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free 
State”) is explanatory; it justifies the right. That syntax was not 
unusual for the times. For example, the free press clause of the 
1842 Rhode Island Constitution states: “The liberty of the press 
being essential to the security of freedom in a state, any person 
may publish his sentiments of any subject.”68 That provision 
surely does not mean that the right to publish protects only the 
press. It protects “any person,” and one reason that it protects 
any person is that a free press is essential to a free society. 
                                                          
64 Id. at 601. 
65 David B. Kopel & Richard E. Gardiner, The Sullivan Principles: Pro-
tecting the Second Amendment from Civil Abuse, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 
737, 739 (1995) (indicating that this is the logical conclusion of the “states’ 
rights only” argument). 
66 Id. at 739. 
67 Emerson, 46 F. Supp. at 601. 
68 R.I. CONST. art. I, § 20 (1842). 
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In a similar vein, Article I, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution 
gives Congress the power to grant copyrights in order to “Pro-
mote progress of Science and useful Arts.”69 Yet copyrights are 
also granted to Hustler magazine, to racist publications, even to 
literature that expressly seeks to retard science and the useful 
arts.70 The proper understanding of the copyright provision is that 
promoting science and the arts is but one justification for the 
copyright power.71 Analogously, the militia clause helps explain 
why we have a right to bear arms, but it is not necessary to the 
exercise of that right.72 
As one might guess, the Clinton administration took a differ-
ent position as illustrated in the following exchange at the oral 
argument before the Fifth Circuit in the Emerson case: 
Judge William L. Garwood: You are saying that the Sec-
ond Amendment is consistent with a position that you can 
take guns away from the public? You restrict ownership 
of rifles, pistols and shotguns from all people? Is that the 
position of the United States? 
Deputy U.S. Attorney General William Meteja: Yes. 
Garwood: Is it the position of the United States that per-
sons who are not in the National Guard are afforded no 
protections under the Second Amendment? 
                                                          
69 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. 
70 See Lund, The Ends of Second Amendment Jurisprudence, supra note 
49, at 176 (arguing that this clause also protects racists and others who seek to 
retard the progress of science and useful arts). 
71 See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (“The economic philosophy be-
hind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the 
conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best 
way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors.”); 
see also Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amend-
ment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 86 (2001). 
72 See Lund The Ends of Second Amendment Jurisprudence, supra note 
49, at 176 (arguing, inter alia, that prefatory phrases found in the Second 
Amendment, “[a] well regulated Militia,” and Article One, § 8, cl. 9, “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” work neither to “limit [n]or 
qualify the operative clause”). 
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Meteja: Exactly. 73 
Meteja later explained that even Guard members are only 
protected by the Second Amendment when and to the extent that 
their weapon is used for Guard business.74 
That view cannot be reconciled with the text of the Second 
Amendment, construed strictly in accordance with its original 
meaning. The term “well-regulated,” in its eighteenth century 
context, does not mean heavily regulated, but properly regulated. 
Looked at in that manner, the Second Amendment ensures that 
the militia would not be improperly regulated, even weakened, 
by disarming the citizens who would be its soldiers.75 
Bear in mind that Article I, section 8 gives Congress, not the 
states, the power to call forth and “provide for organizing, arm-
ing . . . disciplining . . . and for governing” the militia.76 State 
powers are limited to appointing officers and training. The fram-
ers feared and distrusted standing armies; so they provided for a 
federal militia—all able-bodied males over the age of seventeen—
as a counterweight against potential tyranny.77 But the framers 
also realized, in granting Congress near-plenary power over the 
militia, that a select, armed militia subset like today’s National 
Guard could be equivalent to a standing army.78 So they wisely 
crafted the Second Amendment to forbid Congress from disarm-
ing other citizens, thereby certifying that the militia would be 
                                                          
73 Raymond N. Haynes, Second Amendment at Stake in Appellate Case, 
L.A. METRO. NEWS-ENTER., June 27, 2000, at 9. 
74 Id. 
75 See Lund, The Ends of Second Amendment Jurisprudence, supra note 
49, at 175 (asserting that the purpose of the Second Amendment is to prevent 
Congress from using its “necessary and proper” Article I authority to disarm 
the citizenry). 
76 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16. 
77 See Alan Hirsch, The Militia Clauses of the Constitution and the Na-
tional Guard, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 919, 924 (“Indeed, ‘there was not a mem-
ber of the federal convention who did not feel indignation’ at the idea of a 
standing army.” (quoting 3 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATES 
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 401 (1901) 
(remarks of Randolph at Virginia convention))). 
78 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 330-31, 
380-81, 384-88 (Max Ferrand ed. 1966). 
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“well-regulated.” 
Consider also these three changes made by the 1789 Congress 
when it drafted the amendment. First, Congress eliminated a pro-
vision excusing conscientious objectors from military service, 
making it clear that the Second Amendment is about firearms, not 
about military service.79 Second, it stripped the term “well-
armed” as a modifier of “militia,” again clarifying that the arms 
belonged to the people, not the military.80 Third, it dropped the 
phrase “for the common defense” after the words “to keep and 
bear arms.”81 Here there is no ambiguity; the intent was to pro-
vide an individual right of defense, not common defense. 
Finally, consider three other constitutional arguments against 
gun control, apart from the Second Amendment. First, many gun 
regulations are too vague and thus do not provide citizens with 
adequate notice of the particular acts that are illegal.82 In that 
                                                          
79 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison), reprinted in 15 THE 
DOCUMENTED HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 346 (J. 
Kaminski and G. Saladino, eds. 1984); STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY 
MAN BE ARMED 81 (Liberty Press 1994); Symposium, Fresh Looks: The Sec-
ond Amendment: The Highest State of Originalism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
103, 120-121 (2000) [hereinafter Fresh Looks]. 
80 See 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 597-98, 623-24 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976); Fresh Looks, supra 
note 79, at 120-21 (noting that Madison’s first draft of the amendment reading 
“a well armed, and well regulated militia” was changed by the committee of 
the House to read, “[a] well regulated militia, composed of the body of the 
people,” and later to its present form). 
81 See United States v. Emerson, No. 99-10331, 2001 WL 1230757, at 
*25 (5th Cir. Oct. 16, 2001) (“[T]he Senate rejected a proposed amendment to 
add the words ‘for the common defense’ just after ‘the right of the people to 
keep and bear arms.’”); Fresh Looks, supra note 79, at 122. 
82 See, e.g., Robert Batey, Vagueness and the Construction of Criminal 
Statutes—Balancing Acts, 5 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 65 (1997) (acknowl-
edging that gun statutes have recently been attacked for vagueness and the cir-
cuit courts have differed in their interpretations of firearms legislation); Jon S. 
Vernick & Stephen P. Teret, New Courtroom Strategies Regarding Firearms: 
Tort Litigation Against Firearm Manufactures and Constitutional Challenges 
to Gun Laws, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 1713, 1733 (1999) (recognizing “that many 
gun control laws have been challenged on the ground that they are impermis-
sibly vague, in violation of due process”). 
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way, the regulations offend the Due Process Clause.83 Second, 
some federal controls may intrude on matters traditionally subject 
to state supervision, or may exceed the powers of Congress enu-
merated in Article I, section 8. As such, those controls would 
violate the Tenth Amendment.84 Finally, an individual right to 
keep and bear arms could well be among the unenumerated rights 
secured by the Ninth Amendment.85 
III. LITIGATION TYRANNY 
Switching gears from constitutional law to tort law, we next 
turn to the deluge of lawsuits against the gun industry. First, we 
                                                          
83 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. “No State shall make or enforce any 
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person . . . the equal protection 
of the laws.” Id. 
84 U.S. CONST. amend. X. “The powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to 
the States respectively, or to the people.” Id. See also Vernick & Teret, supra 
note 82, at 1720 (recognizing “that opponents to gun regulation statutes have 
raised Tenth Amendment arguments”); Symposium, Triggering Liability: 
Should Manufacturers, Distributors, and Dealers Be Held Accountable for the 
Harm Caused by Guns?: The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act: Does It 
Have a Shot at Success?, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 894, 916 (1995) (ac-
knowledging “that a number of the circuit courts have held that some federal 
gun regulatory acts are unconstitutional because they violate the Tenth 
Amendment”). 
85 U.S. CONST. amend. IX. “The enumeration in the Constitution, of cer-
tain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the 
people.” Id.; see also Nicolas J. Johnson, Beyond the Second Amendment: An 
Individual Right to Arms Viewed Through the Ninth Amendment, 24 RUTGERS 
L.J. 1, 7-12 (1992). Johnson observes that the Supreme Court has acknowl-
edged the existence of unenumerated rights, derived by manipulating enumer-
ated guarantees. Id. at 7 (citing Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment and 
Constitutional Legitimacy, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 37 (1988)). He discusses a 
natural rights view of the Ninth Amendment as a method of manipulation and 
suggests that an individual’s right to arms is a fundamental, natural right. Id. 
at 20. For further discussion of Ninth Amendment interpretation, see Law-
rence E. Mitchell, The Ninth Amendment and the “Jurisprudence of Original 
Intention,” 74 GEO. L.J. 1719 (1986). 
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examine the federal government claims, which the Bush admini-
stration will probably not pursue. Next, we consider litigation by 
more than thirty cities and counties as well as New York State. 
A. Federal Claims 
At the federal level, Clinton’s HUD secretary, Andrew 
Cuomo, had a plan to change the way the nation’s gun makers do 
business.86 He advocated legal action by each of 3400 housing au-
thorities in an attempt to hold gun makers responsible for defray-
ing the cost of security guards and alarm systems installed to 
curb violence in public housing.87 Like the cities, HUD said it 
was not interested in money damages.88 While that may have 
been the case, Cuomo and his acolytes understood very well that 
the small gun industry could not afford to defend itself—even 
against unfounded suits—in the face of such overwhelming fire-
power. Already smothered by litigation from dozens of cities and 
counties, the gun industry would have been crushed under the 
weight of such action. A Wall Street Journal story emphasized 
that very point: 
As with the municipal suits, one filed on behalf of hous-
ing authorities would be groundbreaking and certainly not 
a sure bet to succeed in court. But a suit by a large group 
of housing authorities could [exhaust] gun companies’ re-
sources in pretrial maneuvering—by making demands for 
documents concerning industry distribution practices in 
                                                          
86 See, e.g., Matt Bai, Guns: The Feds Fire a Round: Washington’s New 
Tactic: Target Gunmakers with Litigation, NEWSWEEK INT’L, Dec. 20, 1999 
(commenting that failures in gun war negotiations led to the Clinton White 
House’s plan to initiate a suit on behalf of public housing authorities); Martin 
Kasindorf & Wendy Koch, Industries Try to Build Defenses Against Lawsuits, 
USA TODAY, Dec. 28, 1999, at 11A; Shailagh Murray, HUD’s Cuomo Is 
Drawing Flak for His Stances, Critics Say Ambition Drives Homeless, Gun 
Policies, Not the Agency’s Needs, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 1999, at A20. 
87 See Barrett, HUD May Join the Assault, supra note 2, at A3. 
88 See Daniel Mitchell, Trampling the Rule of Law, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 
17, 1999, at A16 (stating that HUD was primarily “seeking to stop irresponsi-
ble marketing practices on the part of gun makers”). 
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hundreds or thousands of localities.89 
Cuomo’s efforts, in essence, were no better than thinly veiled 
blackmail. 
In justifying HUD’s litigation plans, Cuomo contended that 
“only one percent of the dealers are selling over 50 percent of the 
guns used in crimes.”90 If, however, crimes were linked to guns 
sold by particular dealers, there is no reason why the underlying 
data was not turned over to authorities. It is, in fact, the authori-
ties’ duty to shut down dealers who break laws on the books in 
all fifty states.91 Instead, Cuomo sought to compel gun makers to 
become police, judge, and jury. He expected such makers to fer-
ret out “bad” dealers—some of whom were entirely innocent—
and to deny those dealers, without due process of law, the mer-
chandise that they sell for a living. 
In addition, Cuomo also demanded safer guns.92 “We have 
safety caps on aspirin,” he has stated, so why not safety locks on 
guns?93 That flawed logic, however, overlooks relevant differ-
ences between guns and aspirin. First, the requirement for safety 
caps on aspirin arose out of legislation, not judicial mandate.94 
Second, aspirin is legally accessible to kids, guns are not. Third, 
guns and not aspirin are used to protect human lives; not many 
                                                          
89 Barrett, HUD May Join the Assault, supra note 2, at A3. 
90 Anne Gearan, Threat of Suit Aimed at Putting Pressure on Gun Mak-
ers, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Dec. 9, 1999, at A13. 
91 See generally CAL. PENAL CODE § 12290 (West 2001); MD. CODE 
ANN. art. 27, § 442C (2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 166.418 (1999); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 39-17-1316 (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.2:3 (Michie 
2001). 
92 See Gearan, supra note 90, at A13 (summarizing that “[t]he White 
House and Department of Housing and Urban Development [Cuomo] want 
gun makers to agree to a code of conduct that includes cracking down on dis-
reputable gun dealers and making guns safer”); Eric Rosenberg, U.S. Readies 
Suit Against Gun Manufacturers, Dec. 15, 1999, at A12 (noting that the aim 
of HUD Secretary Andrew Cuomo and Bruce Reed, President Clinton’s point 
man on gun policy, “would be to force manufacturers to produce safer guns 
and new business practices to guard against shady dealers”). 
93 Press Release, A Statement by Secretary Cuomo on School Shooting in 
Michigan (Mar. 1, 2001) (on file with author). 
94 See Poison Prevention Packaging Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1476 (1970). 
LEVYMACRO2-20.DOC 2/22/02 4:26 PM 
 BASELESS GUN LAWSUITS 25 
people when confronted with an emergency will turn to a bottle 
of aspirin for protection. Use of a gun for self-defense could be 
dangerously compromised if the gun is locked. Sammy “The 
Bull” Gravano, the Mafia turncoat, aptly stated, “Safety locks? 
You . . . pull the trigger with a lock on, and I’ll pull the trigger 
[without one]. We’ll see who wins.”95 
If Cuomo was so concerned about unsafe public housing, he 
should have sued his own agency. HUD is responsible for hous-
ing authorities—including their location, selection of tenants, 
eviction policies, even inadequate policing. But rather than admit 
to the abject failure of public housing,96 Cuomo instructed his 
minions to plan lawsuits, modeled after those filed by cities and 
counties from coast to coast. Those baseless lawsuits embody two 
principal legal theories: negligent marketing and defective prod-
ucts. 
B. Negligent Marketing 
The city of Chicago, and other cities following its example, 
accused gun makers of “negligent marketing”—flooding the sub-
urbs where gun laws are relaxed with more guns than suburban 
residents will buy, knowing that the excess will find its way to 
the inner city, where gun laws are more restrictive.97 
Simple economic logic reveals the flaw in Chicago’s negli-
gent marketing claim. If gun makers reduce the supply of fire-
arms sold to suburban dealers, the market price of guns will rise. 
Consumers with the most “elastic” demand—that is, consumers 
who are most sensitive to price changes—will reduce or eliminate 
their purchases. The evidence is clear that those price-sensitive 
                                                          
95 Howard Blum, Reluctant Don, VANITY FAIR, Sept. 1999, at 165. 
96 HUD, under Cuomo’s command, failed to screen tenants, fix elevators, 
and provide policing. See Richard A. Epstein, Lawsuits Aimed at Guns Proba-
bly Won’t Hit Crime, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 1999, at A26. Considering guns to 
be the major problem, HUD focused on suits against manufacturers, and, as a 
result, overlooked vital steps leading to a severe decline in the state of housing 
projects. Id. 
97 See supra note 4 (listing suits filed by counties). 
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consumers are typically law-abiding citizens.98 By contrast, 
criminals’ demand for guns is highly “inelastic.” They operate in 
a “survival at any price” environment, which is why crooks are 
willing to pay inflated black-market prices for firearms. Per-
versely, by restricting the legal supply of guns and raising prices, 
manufacturers will put relatively more weapons in criminals’ 
hands and relatively fewer in the hands of honest citizens. 
Besides, any coordinated industry response to a negligent 
marketing claim would run afoul of the antitrust laws. Manufac-
turers that supposedly overproduce would have to collude in or-
der to reduce production jointly. Although Smith & Wesson is 
aware of how many of its guns are going to, for instance, Mary-
land, those guns, by themselves, do not saturate the Maryland 
market. Smith & Wesson has no idea how many Maryland guns 
are shipped by Colt, Beretta, Glock, Ruger, or any other manu-
facturer. Because brands are more or less interchangeable, no 
single gun maker would agree to cut back production for fear that 
other manufacturers would simply take up the slack. Yet if the 
companies were to collude, an antitrust lawsuit would surely en-
sue. 
An obvious solution to Chicago’s problem, said the judge 
who dismissed the city’s case this past September, would be for 
the police to enforce laws that already prohibit sales to minors, 
felons, the mentally incompetent, and anyone else without a state-
issued firearm owners ID card.99 Instead, Chicago sued gun mak-
ers lawfully selling to wholesalers, who, in turn, sell to licensed 
retailers. The city wanted to hold gun makers liable for the vio-
lent acts of criminals; however, most of these criminals—over 
whom the manufacturer has no control—did not buy from li-
censed retailers.100 As the Seventh Circuit held in Bloomington v. 
                                                          
98 See Michael I. Krauss & Robert A. Levy, So Sue Them, Sue Them: 
Cities Look to Squeeze Gun Makers, WKLY. STANDARD, May 24, 1999, at 19; 
Levy, The New Business, supra note 8, at 599. 
99 See Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 98-CHI15596, at 18 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook 
County filed Nov. 12, 1998); see also Andrew Stern, Judge Dismisses Chi-
cago Suit Against Gun Industry, REUTERS, Sept. 15, 2000. 
100 See Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 98-CHI15596, at 51 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook 
County filed Nov. 12, 1998). 
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Westinghouse,101 a manufacturer cannot be held liable for creation 
of a nuisance by the buyer unless the manufacturer participated in 
the conduct. 
The chain of causation is broken when a criminal act inter-
venes between a gun maker’s original sale and an injury arising 
out of the gun’s violent use. That time-honored principle of law, 
by itself, is sufficient to dismiss these cases.102 A gun maker is 
liable only if the injury was foreseeable. An intervening criminal 
act is foreseeable if it is the natural and probable outcome of the 
gun maker’s sale. Although Americans own roughly 240 million 
guns and commit about 450,000 gun-related crimes each year,103 
only two-tenths of one percent of all guns is involved in criminal 
activity in any given year, even if a different gun is used in each 
of those crimes.104 That negligible chance of criminal conduct 
surely does not cross the “natural and probable outcome” thresh-
old. 
The manufacture, sale, and ownership of handguns are highly 
regulated. If a gun dealer knowingly condones so-called straw 
purchases—those made by legal buyers on behalf of criminals—
                                                          
101 Bloomington v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 891 F.2d 611, 614 (7th 
Cir. 1989) (finding that a manufacturer and seller of chemicals did not commit 
nuisance under Indiana law by selling chemicals that contaminated the city’s 
landfill, sewer system, and sewage treatment plant because the chemicals were 
no longer under the defendant’s control). 
102 See, e.g., Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta 
U.S.A. Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 245, 259 (D.N.J. 2000) (finding that the 
causal connection was weak, amounting to scarcely more than “an assertion 
that because the gun manufacturers distribute their products, they eventually 
fall into the wrong hands, are used to commit crimes against persons and 
property, causing the County to expend money for law enforcement”); Bennet 
v. Cincinnati Checker Cab Co., 353 F. Supp. 1206, 1210 (E.D. Ky. 1975) 
(holding that the criminal act on the part of the shooter acted as a superseding 
cause, thereby breaking the chain of causation); see also Shaun R. Bonney, 
Using the Courts to Target Firearm Manufacturers, 37 IDAHO L. REV. 167, 
191-92 (2000) (arguing that gun manufacturers are unlikely to be held liable 
under traditional tort law in which causation is an essential element). 
103 See John R. Lott, Jr., Suits Targeting Gun Makers Are Off the Mark, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 1999, at A18. 
104 Id. 
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the dealer can be prosecuted under current law.105 As of April 
2000, seventeen months after Chicago filed its lawsuit, only four 
of the retailers targeted by the city’s undercover “stings” had 
been charged.106 In the only case to go to trial, the jury took but 
ten minutes to find the defendant not guilty.107 If the behavior of 
those dealers was as egregious as the city’s complaint suggests, 
why were there only four indictments and zero convictions? 
Nationwide, thousands of laws regulate everything from who 
can own a gun and how it can be purchased to where one can 
possess or use it.108 Nonetheless, in 1998 there were only eight 
federal prosecutions for the thousands of instances that guns were 
brought illegally onto school grounds.109 According to a Syracuse 
University study, from 1992 to 1999, federal gun prosecutions 
declined by 43%.110 Over the two years ended mid-1999, the Bu-
reau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (“BATF”) traced half of 
the guns used in crimes to 389 dealers, but only nineteen had 
                                                          
105 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(2) (making it illegal for a dealer to ship or 
transport to any person other than a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, 
licensed dealer, or licensed collector). 
106 Devon Spurgeon & Paul M. Barrett, Operation Gunsmoke, Touted as 
a Big Deal, Makes a Small Mark, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2000, at A1. 
107 Id. 
108 See John R. Lott, Jr., Gun Laws Can Be Dangerous, Too, WALL ST. 
J., May 12, 1999, at A22; see also Kopel & Gardiner, supra note 65, at 762-
63. 
Handguns are the only consumer product that an American consumer 
is forbidden to purchase outside his state of residence. They are the 
only mass consumer product for which retailers, wholesalers, and 
manufacturers all require federal licenses. They are among a tiny 
handful of consumer products for which the federal government regu-
lates simple possession, and further regulates the terms of retail trans-
actions, going so far as to require (for handguns) that police be noti-
fied and given an opportunity to disapprove the sale before being 
allowed to consummate the transaction. 
Kopel & Gardiner, supra note 65, at 762-63. 
109 See Peter J. Boyer, Big Guns, NEW YORKER, May 17, 1999, at 62. 
110 See Edward Walsh, Clinton Plans Gun Initiative, WASH. POST, Jan. 
18, 2000, at A2. 
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their licenses revoked.111 Moreover, a BATF study released in 
June 2000 documented 1,700 federal and state gun-law prosecu-
tions and 1,000 verdicts from July 1996 through December 
1998.112 On a per-year basis, that equals 680 prosecutions and 
400 guilty pleas—trivial numbers when contrasted with roughly 
500,000 gun crimes committed in the United States each year. 
The effect of more rigorous law enforcement and stiffer pen-
alties is apparent from Richmond’s experience with Project Ex-
ile113—a federal program that, in part, mandates a five-year 
minimum sentence in federal prison for any felon caught carrying 
or trying to buy a gun.114 As a result of the program, Richmond 
reported a 36% decline in gun homicides and 37% drop in armed 
robberies for the 1997 calendar year.115 When the National Rifle 
Association (“NRA”) sought to expand Project Exile, it received 
little support from the Clinton administration until September 
1999, at which time the president requested an inconsequential 
budget increase of $5 million.116 Congressional Republicans had 
wanted $27 million, albeit targeted at cities in states where the 
                                                          
111 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, PUB. NO. NCJ 180795, FEDERAL FIREARMS OFFENDERS, 1992-98 
(2000); see also Fox Butterfield, Limits on Power and Zeal Hamper Firearms 
Agency, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1999, at A1. Julius Wachtel, retired after 
twenty-three years as a BATF agent, remarked that he and his co-workers had 
a saying: “No cases, no waves. Little cases, little waves. Big cases, big 
waves.” Id. 
112 Treasury Makes Case for Gun Show Clampdown, REUTERS, June 21, 
2000. 
113 Developed in 1997 by the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Richmond, “Pro-
ject Exile” facilitated the prosecution of illegal gun offenses in federal court, 
created stiffer bond rules and sentencing guidelines, expedited the reporting 
system, and decreased processing time for felons with gun charges associated 
with domestic violence. In addition, the program improved police officer 
training on federal firearms statutes and search and seizure issues. See Daniel 
C. Richman, “Project Exile” and the Allocation of Federal Law Enforcement 
Authority, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 369, 378-80 (2001). 
114 Id. at 380. 
115 See generally Michael Janofsky, Fighting Crime by Making Federal 
Case About Guns, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1999, at A12. 
116 See Saundra Torry, Federal-Local Gun Control Venture Stymied by 
Success, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 1999, at A1. 
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senators on the Appropriations Committee served, not at cities 
where crime rates were highest.117 
To be sure, the states, not the federal government, exercise 
general police power. Why should federal courts be turned into 
what one federal judge in Richmond characterized as “police 
courts”?118 It would be far better for the states to stiffen their own 
penalties than to federalize yet more crimes.119 Indeed, the feder-
alization of most gun crimes cannot be squared with the Tenth 
Amendment, which permits the federal government to exercise 
only those powers that are enumerated in the Constitution and 
delegated by it to the United States.120 Still, many federal crimi-
nal laws would qualify as a legitimate exercise of state police 
power. In any event, non-enforcement—whether state or fed-
eral—cannot be laid at the doorstep of gun makers. 
Naturally, if existing laws are not being enforced, the best 
bet, according to the politicians, is to pass more laws. In the Chi-
cago suburbs, for example, the Cook County legislature could 
have enacted more restrictive gun laws. For whatever reasons, it 
chose not to do so. Instead, Cook County signed on as co-
plaintiff in Chicago’s lawsuit to do what the county elected not 
to. In effect, Cook County’s complaint to the court, quite liter-
ally, is that the county has itself failed to pass appropriate legisla-
tion. 
C. Defective Product 
Apart from negligent marketing, the second major claim 
among cities suing the gun industry is that firearms are “defec-
tive and unreasonably dangerous” as they are currently manufac-
tured.121 In order to hold gun makers liable for selling an unsafe 
                                                          
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Richmond’s program, renamed Virginia Exile, is now under state con-
trol. See 160 Arrested as a Result of Virginia Exile, A.P., July 2, 2001. 
120 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
121 See Ray Delgado, S.F. Joins Suit Against Gun Makers; Plaintiff Cities 
Ask Restitution, Saying Firms Knowingly Get Weapons to Criminals, S.F. 
EXAM’R., May 25, 1999, at A3 (“Cities have gone after the gun industry in a 
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product, tort law requires a true defect, not merely that a product 
is dangerous when it does what it is designed to do.122 The Wash-
ington Post has editorialized: “As a legal matter, it is hard to see 
how companies making lawful products can be held liable when 
those products perform precisely as intended.”123 With that in 
mind, what then is the true defect of a firearm? Does it misfire, 
or fire inaccurately? Not at all. Yet New Orleans and other cities 
have insisted that guns are defective if sold without devices that 
prevent discharge by unauthorized users. On that ground, the cit-
ies hope to drag gun makers to the settlement table—turning the 
law of product liability on its head. 
Legislatures across the nation have regulated virtually every 
aspect of gun design and distribution. If a determination is to be 
made that guns are unreasonably dangerous, the legislature, con-
strained by the Constitution, must make that determination, not 
the courts. A federal judge in Massachusetts aptly captured this 
sentiment in Wasylow v. Glock: “Frustration at the failure of leg-
islatures to enact laws sufficient to curb handgun injuries is not 
adequate reason to engage the judicial forum in efforts to imple-
ment a broad policy change.”124 
Even Brooklyn’s Jack Weinstein, the favorite federal judge of 
the plaintiff’s bar, had this comment about the safety of guns:    
Whether or not . . . products liability law would require 
                                                          
variety of ways, filing products liability suits that charge manufacturers with 
turning out poorly made guns or guns that lack safety measures.”); Mark 
Long, Judge Dismisses Miami’s Lawsuit Against Gun Makers, LEGAL 
INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 15, 1999, at 4 (discussing Miami’s lawsuit, whereby 
the city alleged that “[gun] manufacturers negligently design their guns”); 
George Will, New Orleans Takes Aim at Gun Makers, AUSTIN AM. 
STATESMAN, Jan. 24, 1999, at H3 (discussing New Orleans’ suit against fif-
teen gun manufacturers, whereby the city sought damages based on the sales 
of guns that were unreasonably dangerous because “they did not incorporate 
recognition technologies that would prevent their use by children or by anyone 
other than the owner”). 
122 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 
(1998) (“[P]roducts are not generically defective merely because they are dan-
gerous.”). 
123 Editorial, Guns in Court, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 1999, at A18. 
124 975 F. Supp. 370, 381 (D. Mass. 1996). 
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an anti-theft safety mechanism as part of the design of 
handguns requires a balancing of the risk and utility. . . . 
Plaintiffs have not shown that such a device is available, 
nor have they asserted the possibility of showing at trial 
that such a device would satisfy the . . . risk-utility test.125  
Weinstein added that “[t]he mere act of manufacturing and sell-
ing a handgun does not give rise to liability absent a defect in the 
manufacture or design of the product itself.”126 
 If guns are inherently defective, then New Orleans and other 
cities that have swap programs bring their suits under a cloud of 
hypocrisy. In 1998 the New Orleans Police Department traded 
more than 8,000 confiscated weapons—40% of which were semi-
automatic—to a commercial dealer in return for Glocks.127 Nearly 
half of the traded guns would have been characterized as “un-
safe” in the city’s own lawsuit against gun makers—including 
TEC9s,128 AK47s,129 and Uzis,130 banned since 1994. Only one-
fourth of the guns had safety locks. Still, Mayor Marc Morial 
signed and approved the deal, paving the way for resale of those 
                                                          
125 See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307, 1323 (E.D.N.Y. 
1996). 
126 Id. 
127 See Matt Labash, Lawyers, Guns, and Money, WEEKLY STANDARD, 
Feb. 1, 1999, at 25-29. 
128 A TEC9 is an inexpensive auto-loaded assault pistol manufactured by 
Intratec Firearms. See Firearm Information by Type, at http://recguns.com/ 
IIIC2jl.html. Although not a fully automatic firearm, it looks like a miniature 
submachine gun and features a threaded barrel and a thirty-round magazine. 
Id. 
129 An AK47 is a military assault rifle designed in 1947 by Russian Gen-
eral Mikhail Kalashnikov. See The AK47 Page, at http://members.tripod.com/ 
sa93/ak47.html. It is a cheaply manufactured lightweight automatic weapon. 
Id. The AK-47 was the weapon of choice for the former Soviet Union and 
Eastern European countries. Id. 
130 The Uzi is a compact automatic weapon designed by Uziel Gal, an of-
ficer in the Israeli Army. Uzi Submachine Gun, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
available at http://www.britannica.com. Law enforcement personnel and 
members of the Special Forces use it widely. Id. The weapon’s design is based 
on earlier Czech designs, “in which bullets were fed into the gun’s chamber 
from a box shaped magazine inserted into the pistol. . . .” Id. 
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guns across the nation.131 Ironically, New Orleans could end up 
as defendant in other cities’ suits. 
Under pressure, Morial suspended the swap program.132 But 
New Orleans was not the only hypocritical plaintiff. Police de-
partments in Boston, Detroit, Oakland, Miami, St. Louis, and 
Bridgeport have also traded-in “unsafe” guns, which are now 
back on the street, even while suing gun makers for marketing a 
defective product.133 Undoubtedly sensitive to the bad publicity, 
several police departments announced they that would explore 
lease programs, rather than trade-in programs, with Glock.134 
While such a policy might relieve the city of direct responsibility 
for providing unsafe guns for commercial resale, the revised con-
tractual arrangement merely camouflages the same deal, the re-
cycling of “defective” products for use by private citizens. 
Whether the claim is a defective product or negligent market-
ing, these lawsuits are baseless. Only five of them have reached 
final judgment and all five were fully or partially dismissed.135 
For example in October 1999, an Ohio state judge threw out Cin-
cinnati’s claims, holding that gun makers are not responsible for 
the criminal misconduct of customers. “The city’s complaint is 
an improper attempt to have this court substitute its judgment for 
that of the legislature,” the judge explained.136 The suits in 
                                                          
131 See Labash, supra note 127, at 25-29. 
132 See Jake Tapper, City Slickers, SALON NEWS, July 13, 1999 at 25-29. 
133 Id.; see also Vanessa O’Connell & Paul M. Barrett, Unloading Old 
Police Guns: More Cities Ban Trade-Ins and Resales, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 
1999, at A1. 
134 See Vanessa O’Connell & Paul M. Barrett, Cities Suing Gun Firms 
Have a Weak Spot: They’re Suppliers, Too, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 1999, at 
A1. 
135 Other suits have been allowed to proceed in part, but none has pre-
vailed on final judgment. See Supreme Court: State Can Block New Orleans 
from Suing Gun Makers, A.P., Apr. 3, 2001. In 1999, Atlanta survived a mo-
tion to dismiss its design defect claim. Id. The following year, New Orleans 
also survived full dismissal, as did Cleveland, Wayne County, and San Diego. 
Id. In April 2001, however, the Louisiana Supreme Court threw out the New 
Orleans claim, citing state law that bans litigation by cities against the gun in-
dustry. Id. 
136 Court Rejects Cincinnati Suit Against Gun Industry, REUTERS, Oct. 7, 
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Bridgeport and Miami were also dismissed in December 1999. 
Miami’s judge observed that the city could not use the courts to 
regulate because that is the job of the legislature.137 A Florida ap-
peals court upheld the Miami ruling, calling the lawsuit “an at-
tempt to regulate firearms . . . through the . . . judiciary.”138 
“Clearly this round-about attempt is being made because of the 
County’s frustration at its inability to regulate firearms,” the ap-
peals court wrote. “The County’s frustration cannot be alleviated 
through litigation.”139 
On September 15, 2000, a judge threw out Chicago’s negli-
gent marketing claim saying that statistical evidence of causation 
was insufficient, and that individual instances of illegal sales 
were a matter for the police to counter.140 Most recently, on De-
cember 21, 2000, a federal judge dismissed Philadelphia’s 
claims, describing the city’s charge of public nuisance as “a the-
ory in search of a case,” and rejecting the negligence claim “for 
lack of proximate cause.”141 
Nevertheless, the trial lawyers press forward. Sooner or later 
they will likely find a sympathetic judge who is willing to ignore 
the law in order to effectuate his personal policy preferences. 
Such forum shopping is a favorite tactic of the plaintiffs’ bar. In 
fact, the major reason each city has sued its local dealers as well 
as gun manufacturers is so that a plaintiff and at least one defen-
dant reside in the same jurisdiction. In that way, the case cannot 
be removed to federal court, where the rule of law generally pre-
vails—outweighing provincial prejudices. 
While the search for friendly forums moves ahead, pending 
lawsuits are having predictable effects. Smaller gun makers are 
going out of business. For example, two California dealers have 
declared bankruptcy. Colt announced a layoff of 300 workers and 
                                                          
1999. 
137 See Paul M. Barrett, Florida Judge Dismisses County’s Suit Filed 
Against Handgun Manufacturers, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 1999, at B15. 
138 Id. 
139 Florida Appeals Court Rejects Gun Suit, REUTERS, Feb. 23, 2001. 
140 See Andrew Stern, supra note 99. 
141 Shannon P. Duffy, Philly Loses Its Gun Maker Suit, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 
8, 2001, at A4. 
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said it would withdraw from the consumer handgun business, fo-
cusing instead on military weapons and collectibles.142 Prospec-
tive litigation costs are showing up in higher gun prices. Top 
quality handguns are now priced in the $350 to $550 range, and 
fewer guns are available for less than $100. Those higher prices 
have less impact on criminal demand than on the demand from 
price-sensitive, law-abiding, especially inner-city citizens. 
D. Smith & Wesson Settlement 
On a parallel track, threatened litigation by the federal gov-
ernment and actual litigation by dozens of cities were used as a 
bludgeon to force the industry’s largest manufacturer, Smith & 
Wesson, into a settlement. Despite countervailing pressure from 
its customers and other gun makers, Smith & Wesson threw in 
the towel—explaining that $100 million or more in damages, 
sought by several of the larger cities, exceeded the company’s 
profits for the entire past decade.143 Moreover, the company pro-
tested, it cost $1 million to defend against each government-
sponsored claim.144 Smith & Wesson simply didn’t have the re-
sources to fight multiple lawsuits across the country. Accord-
ingly, on March 17, 2000, it surrendered.145 
Essentially, the Smith & Wesson deal is no better than a 
shakedown. Various government entities—HUD at the federal 
level, New York and Connecticut at the state level, and thirteen 
cities—agreed not to pursue their baseless but costly suits against 
the company.146 Other cities and counties offered to review their 
                                                          
142 See Colt Said to Be Cutting Handgun Sales, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 11, 
1999, at A1. 
143 See Gary Fields, For Smith & Wesson, Blanks Instead of a Magic Bul-
let, WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 2000, at A24 [hereinafter Fields, For Smith & 
Wesson]. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. “[T]he $100 million sought in the suit brought by the city of Bos-
ton eclipsed [the] company’s combined profit for the past decade.” Id. 
146 See Paul M. Barrett, Smith & Wesson Rivals Face Antitrust Probe, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 2000, at B18 [hereinafter Barrett, Smith & Wesson Ri-
vals]; Edward Walsh & David A. Vise, U.S., Gunmaker Strike a Deal: Smith 
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suits, but made no formal commitment to exclude Smith & Wes-
son.147 In return, the gun maker pledged, first, to impose a num-
ber of restrictions on its dealers and distributors: (a) No sales of 
any manufacturer’s guns unless the buyer has passed a safety 
course and cleared a background check—even if the check takes 
longer than the three-day period required by law; (b) no sales at 
any gun shows unless all sales at the show are subject to a back-
ground check;148 (c) no sales of Smith & Wesson guns if “a dis-
proportionate number of crimes” is traced to guns sold by a 
dealer or distributor;149 and (d) no purchase by one person of 
more than one gun at a time unless the buyer is willing to wait 
fourteen days before picking up the remaining guns.150 
Second, Smith & Wesson agreed to childproof all of its hand-
guns within a year, presumably by using features like a heavier 
trigger pull or a magazine disconnect, which prevent a gun from 
firing once the magazine is removed. Under terms of the settle-
ment, every Smith & Wesson handgun would also be equipped 
with an external lock within sixty days and an internal lock 
within twenty-four months.151 
Third, the settlement required that each gun have a hidden se-
                                                          
& Wesson Plans Safety, Sales Steps Suit Threats Dropped, WASH. POST, Mar. 
18, 2000, at A1. 
147 See Sharon Walsh, Gun Industry Views Pact as Threat to Its Unity, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2000, at A10; Steven Wilmsen, Smith & Wesson, City 
Settle Lawsuit, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 12, 2000, at B4. 
148 On April 13, 2000, Smith & Wesson issued a clarification—disputed 
by lawyers for the settling cities—regarding the scope of background checks. 
Smith & Wesson insisted that checks were required only for its weapons, not 
those of other manufacturers, and that checks at gun shows applied only to li-
censed dealers, not private citizens. See Smith & Wesson, Government Reaf-
firm Settlement, WASH. POST, Apr. 14, 2000, at A7. 
149 Susan Milligan, Gun Maker to Add Safety Measures, Clinton Hails 
Smith & Wesson Act, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 18, 2000, at A1. 
150 See Walsh & Vise, supra note 146, at A1. 
151 See DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN SMITH & WESSON AND THE DEPARTMENTS OF 
TREASURY AND HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
AND STATES (2000), available at http://www.hud.gov. 
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rial number to facilitate tracing a weapon used in a crime.152 
Fourth (reminiscent of the tobacco settlement that forced manu-
facturers to fund anti-smoking programs), Smith & Wesson 
promised to “work together to support legislative efforts to re-
duce firearm misuse” and contribute 1% of its revenue toward an 
“education trust fund” to inform the public about the risk of fire-
arms.153 An Oversight Committee in each settling city—
comprised of one Smith & Wesson official and one representative 
each from the city, county, state, and federal government—was 
set to monitor and supervise all provisions of the settlement.154 
Those terms and conditions obscure what is actually driving 
the settlement. From the government’s perspective, the settlement 
was a means to bypass state and federal legislatures that had been 
singularly unresponsive to a variety of gun control proposals. 
Moreover, the settlement circumvents court review in many juris-
dictions. Judicial approval would be required only in jurisdictions 
where lawsuits had already been filed and were to be dismissed 
as a condition of the settlement. That excludes the suits threat-
ened but not filed by HUD and various cities and states. 
To sweeten the deal further, President Clinton sought to as-
semble the Communities for Safer Guns Coalition, an alliance of 
local governments, along with HUD, that would refrain from 
buying police firearms manufactured by any company that did not 
sign the settlement.155 That commitment to favor Smith & Wes-
son was not embedded in the text of the settlement agreement, 
but communicated informally by Clinton.156 Perhaps Clinton 




155 The Communities for Safer Guns Coalition was announced formally on 
March 22, 2000 by HUD Secretary Andrew Cuomo. See generally Ed So-
mers, Communities for Safer Guns Coalition Doubles to 411, CRIME AND 
DRUGS, May 22, 2000, available at http://www.usmayors.org/uscm/wash_ 
update/crime/coalition052200.htm; Ed Somers, Mayors, Counties, State AG’s 
Form “Communities for Safer Guns Coalition,” CRIME AND DRUGS, Mar. 31, 
2000, available at http://www.usmaors.org/uscm/wash_update/crime/0033100 
a.htm. 
156 See Edward Walsh & Helen Dewar, Government Coalition to Try to 
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knew that such an arrangement might violate local and federal 
procurement regulations, discriminate against law abiding gun 
makers, and deny disfavored companies the right to pursue a le-
gitimate business. 
In June 2000, the House of Representatives attempted, unsuc-
cessfully, to pass a bill prohibiting enforcement of the Smith & 
Wesson settlement.157 It did, however, approve a provision that 
would prevent spending in support of Clinton’s coalition, which 
ultimately comprised 600 localities that agreed, first, not to sue 
Smith & Wesson and, second, to favor the company in police gun 
buys.158 Shortly thereafter, the Senate approved of a bill barring 
federal procurement preferences for Smith & Wesson.159 With a 
change in administration, the settlement probably will not attract 
other gun makers as co-signers, nor is the settlement likely to 
benefit Smith & Wesson, which announced this past June that it 
was closing two of its plants for a month, partly due to adverse 
customer reaction.160 
As the real terms of the settlement (including preferential 
contracting) became clear, seven gun makers and their trade as-
sociation, the National Shooting Sports Foundation (“NSSF”), 
filed suit against HUD Secretary Cuomo, New York attorney 
general Eliot Spitzer, Connecticut attorney general Richard Blu-
menthal, and fourteen mayors for conspiring to violate the consti-
                                                          
Pressure Gunmakers, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 2000, at A8. 
Seeking to keep pressure on the gun industry, Housing and Urban 
Development Secretary Andrew M. Cuomo and representatives of the 
[Communities for Safer Guns Coalition] said the combined purchas-
ing power of federal, state and local law enforcement should be 
brought to bear on gun manufacturers to pressure them into adopting 
the Smith & Wesson agreement or risk the economic consequences. 
Id. 
157 H. AMDT. 863, 106th Cong. (2000), available at http://thomas.loc. 
gov. 
158 See Fields, For Smith & Wesson, supra note 143, at A24; Alan Fram, 
House Votes Affect Gun Agreement, A.P., June 21, 2000. 
159 See Fields, For Smith & Wesson, supra note 143, at A24. 
160 Gun Maker to Suspend Factory Lines, A.P., June 13, 2000. 
LEVYMACRO2-20.DOC 2/22/02 4:26 PM 
 BASELESS GUN LAWSUITS 39 
tutional right of the gun makers to engage in trade.161 The plain-
tiffs asked a federal court to forbid new gun regulations that were 
not authorized by Congress.162 By August 2000, however, it was 
apparent that the buying preferences had not materialized. Police 
departments, for obvious reasons, wanted the best weapons avail-
able. Even HUD bought guns from Glock,163 which did not sign 
the settlement yet continued to supply roughly two-thirds of po-
lice weapons nationally.164 In January 2001, NSSF and the seven 
gun makers dropped their suit.165 
On another front, to intensify the pressure for a settlement, 
Cuomo, Spitzer, and Blumenthal threatened an antitrust suit 
against Smith & Wesson’s rivals for organizing a boycott against 
that company’s products. Blumenthal issued subpoenas for docu-
ments, despite no “solid evidence” other than a post-settlement 
industry meeting attended by a number of gun makers, who ex-
pressed criticism of Smith & Wesson and the settlement.166 
Spitzer pulled no punches. The goal, he gloated, was to “squeeze 
[gun] manufacturers like a pincers,”167 proving once again that 
unprincipled politicians are more than willing to use the antitrust 
laws as a club to force conformity by companies that refuse to 
play ball. 
IV. GUNS, CRIME AND ACCIDENTS 
“Rome remained free for four hundred years and Sparta 
for eight hundred” with an armed populace, while other 
countries who disarmed their citizens “lost their liberties 
                                                          
161 National Shooting Sports Found. v. Cuomo, No. 00-CV-1063 (N.D. 
Ga. filed Jan. 5, 2001). 
162 See Lisa Richwine, Gunmakers File Suit Against U.S., States, Mayors, 
REUTERS, Apr. 26, 2000. 
163 See Fields, For Smith & Wesson, supra note 143, at A24. 
164 See Walsh & Dewar, supra note 156, at A8. 
165 See Gunmakers Drop Suit Against HUD, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 2001, 
at A12. 
166 See Barrett, Smith & Wesson Rivals, supra note 146, at B18. 
167 See Peter Slevin & Sharon Walsh, Connecticut Subpoenas Firms in 
Gun Antitrust Probe, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 2000, at A2. 
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in less than forty years.”168 
 
Paradoxically, politicians who are busily abusing the rule of 
law, and zealots so eager to put gun makers out of business, 
overlook compelling statistics suggesting that the anti-gun cru-
sade, if successful, would leave Americans more, not less, 
susceptible to gun violence. Three thousand criminals are 
lawfully killed each year by armed civilians.169 By comparison, 
police kill fewer than 1,000 criminals annually.170 Guns are used 
defensively over two million times per year, and are often merely 
brandished, not fired.171 That number is far greater than the 
483,000 gun-related crimes reported to police in 1996.172 
Nationwide, as Yale scholar John Lott has demonstrated, the 
higher the number of carry permits in a state, the larger the drop 
in violent crime.173 Our country’s most permissive gun carry laws 
are in Vermont, which has a very low crime rate.174 Half of our 
population lives in thirty-one states that have “shall issue” 
laws.175 Such laws mandate that a permit be granted to anyone 
                                                          
168 STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED 22 (Liberty 
Press 1994) (quoting NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE ART OF WAR 18 (Ellis 
Farneworth ed. 2001)). 
169 See H. Sterling Burnett, Making Guns Safe for Lawyers, WASH. 
TIMES, Jan. 25, 1999, at A19. 
170 See id. 
171 John R. Lott Jr., Will Suing Gunmakers Endanger Lives? CHI. TRIB., 
Nov. 17, 1998, at 19 [hereinafter Lott, Suing Gunmakers]. 
172 See Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Sourcebook of 
Criminal Justice Statistics 1997, at 274 Table 3.116, in H. Sterling Burnett, 
Suing Gun Manufacturers: Hazardous to Our Health, 5 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 
433, 446 (2001). 
173 Lott, Suing Gunmakers, supra note 171, at 19. 
174 See Concealed Weapons, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., June 6, 1997, at 16B, 
available at 1997 WL 4545759. “The state of Vermont has long allowed con-
cealed carry with no permit whatsoever—and Vermont has the lowest violent 
crime rate in the United States.” Id. Vermont’s violent crime rate was 120 
violent crimes per 100,000 people in 1997. In comparison, the national violent 
crime rate was 611 violent crimes per 100,000 people. See U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1999, 250 (2000). 
175 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-3302 (Michie 2000); IND. CODE § 35-47-
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above the age of twenty-one who is mentally competent, has no 
criminal record, pays the requisite fee, and passes a gun safety 
course.176 Those states have not turned into Dodge City, writes 
columnist Jonathan Rauch, “with fender-benders becoming hail-
storms of lead.”177 
Data shows that Dodge City was actually safer than today’s 
Washington, D.C., which has the highest gun murder rate in the 
United States, accompanied by the strictest gun control.178 Is that 
because guns are readily available in nearby Virginia? Why then 
is the D.C. murder rate fifty-seven per 100,000 while the murder 
rate in Arlington, Virginia, an urban community just across the 
river, is only 1.6 per 100,000?179 In D.C., social pathologies—
like illegitimacy, unemployment, dysfunctional schools, and sub-
stance abuse—promote crime while in Virginia guns deter crime. 
In reality, less than 5% of the population takes out concealed 
handgun permits.180 The rest of us benefit because the criminals 
do not know which 5% are armed. Laws permitting the carrying 
of concealed handguns reduce murder by about 8% and rape by 
about 5%.181 Police carry guns; mayors and bodyguards carry 
guns; why not law-abiding residents of high crime areas? 
In May 1998, the House of Representatives passed—by voice 
vote with almost no debate—a bill permitting federal judges (in-
cluding bankruptcy judges and even some retired judges) to carry 
                                                          
2 (2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-47-8 (2000). 
176 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-3302 (Michie 2000) (stating that “[t]he 
sheriff of a county shall, within ninety (90) days after filing of an application 
by any person who is not disqualified from possessing or receiving a firearm 
under state or federal law, issue a license to carry a weapon concealed on his 
person within this state for four (4) years from the date of issue”). 
177 Jonathan Rauch, And Don’t Forget Your Gun, NAT’L J., Mar. 20, 
1999, available at 1999 WL 8102265. 
178 Id. 
179 Firearms Fact-Sheet, Gun Owners Foundation, at http://www.gun-
owners.org. 
180 See Rauch, supra note 177. 
181 JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING 
CRIME AND GUN CONTROL LAWS 51 (1998). 
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concealed guns in any state, despite state laws to the contrary.182 
A Florida federal district judge, Harvey Schlesinger, had this to 
say: “If a judge is in danger, the fact that he or she is in one state 
or the other does not eliminate the danger.”183 He might have 
made the same statement about any person at risk. 
That high gun ownership is the cause of the high murder rate 
in the United States is a myth. Comparable statistics from other 
countries demonstrate that there is no correlation between high 
gun ownership and high murder rates. In Switzerland, Finland, 
and New Zealand, roughly the same percentage of the population 
owns guns as in the U.S., but we have a far higher murder 
rate.184 In Israel, moreover, gun ownership is 40% above the 
U.S. rate, but the murder rate is far lower.185 Further foreign sta-
tistics demonstrate that disarming a population leads to increased 
crime rates. In Australia, for example, the population was dis-
armed in 1998.186 Since then, homicides are up 3.2%, assaults up 
8.6%, and armed robberies up 44%.187 For twenty-five years 
prior, armed robberies and homicides committed with firearms 
had declined.188 
As that and other evidence suggests, armed civilians in fact 
deter crime. Examples abound of instances when armed citizens 
                                                          
182 Federal Courts Protection Act of 1998, H.R. 2294, 105th Cong. § 304 
(1998). 
183 Elizabeth A. Palmer, House Votes to Expand Federal Judges’ Gun 
Rights, Use of Cameras in Court, CQ WEEKLY, May 27, 2000, at 1277. 
184 John R. Lott, Jr., Gun Control Advocates Purvey Deadly Myths, 
WALL ST. J, Nov. 11, 1998, at A22 [hereinafter Lott, Gun Control Advo-
cates]. Interestingly, in Israel, armed teachers are common. See Massad 
Ayoob, Arm Teachers to Stop School Shootings, WALL ST. J., May 21, 1999, 
at A12. The terrorist threat is pervasive; but there are few terrorist attacks at 
schools. Id. 
185 Lott, Gun Control Advocates, supra note 184, at A22. 
186 See Ayoob, supra note 184, at A12. 
187 Ann Coulter, Massacres Don’t Occur When Intended Victims Are 
Armed, UNIVERSAL PRESS SYNDICATE, July 30, 1999, available at http:// 
www.uexpress.com/anncoulter. 
188 Gun Control: Less Protection, More Crime, FLA. TIMES UNION, Apr. 
7, 1999, at B6; see also DAVID B. KOPEL, THE SAMURAI, THE MOUNTIE, AND 
THE COWBOY 193-232 (1992). 
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have prevented horrific crimes through the use of firearms. An 
armed gun-store employee in Santa Clara, California shot a cus-
tomer who had threatened to kill three others.189 Armed citizens 
prevented massacres in Anniston, Alabama, Pearl, Mississippi, 
and Edinboro, Pennsylvania.190 Yet the response of some politi-
cians is to disarm those very same citizens. 
Gun control advocates reject the well-supported argument that 
guns deter crime. Instead, they point to a study by Arthur Kel-
lerman, who concluded that families possessing a gun are twenty-
two times more likely to kill other family members or acquaint-
ances than to kill in self-defense.191 But what is not factored into 
the Kellerman equation is the fact that a gun is rarely fired in a 
self-defense scenario; the value of the gun in such an instance is 
to deter, not kill.192 Moreover, 85% of the deaths that Kellerman 
cites are suicides.193 He explains that suicides are five times more 
likely if there is a gun in the home.194 Kellerman, however, has 
the causal relationship exactly backwards. Gun possession does 
not lead someone to commit suicide; instead, emotionally dis-
turbed people acquire guns precisely because they intend, or may 
be psychologically prone, to commit suicide.195 
Again conflating cause and effect, Kellerman notes that a 
handgun in the home raises the risk of death by 3.4 times.196 Yet 
he misses the obvious link. People at risk buy guns; the risk mo-
tivates the purchase, not vice versa.197 By analogy, a storeowner 
                                                          
189 See Vin Suprynowicz, No Serial Killings This Week in Santa Clara, 
LAS VEGAS REV.-J., July 11, 1999, at 2E. 
190 See Coulter, supra note 187. 
191 See Paul M. Barrett, In Gun Debate, Both Sides Simplify Data to Make 
a Case, WALL ST. J., May 27, 1999, at B1 [hereinafter Barrett, In Gun De-
bate]. 
192 See id. 
193 DAN POLSBY, FIREARMS AND CRIME, INDEP. INST. (1997), available 
at http://www.independent.org/tii/catalog_pr/policy_FirarmsAndCrime.html. 
194 See Barrett, In Gun Debate, supra note 191, at B1. 
195 See Barrett, In Gun Debate, supra note 191, at B1. 
196 See David B. Kopel, Guns, Germs, and Science: Public Health Ap-
proaches to Gun Control, 84 J. MED. ASS’N GA. 269, 271 (June 1995). 
197 See Don B. Kates, et al., Guns and Public Health: Epidemic of Vio-
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might decide to put iron bars on his store windows if the store 
was located in a high crime area. Surely, no one would suggest 
that the store would be safer if it removed the bars. Nor would a 
family in a high risk inner city environment be safer if it relin-
quished its handgun. The gun, like the bars, serves to safeguard 
lives and property. 
The important point to remember is that each individual could 
well be the sole means of his own defense. Kopel and Gardiner 
make the point as follows: 
Governments are immune from suit for failure—even 
grossly negligent or deliberate failure—to protect citizens 
from crime. Similarly, governments are immune from suit 
for injuries inflicted by criminals who were given early 
release on parole. Accordingly, it would be highly inap-
propriate for the government, through the courts, to make 
it . . . impossible for persons to own handguns for self-
defense because, supposedly, ordinary Americans are too 
stupid and clumsy to use them effectively. If the Judiciary 
will not question the government’s civil immunity for 
failure to protect people, the courts certainly should not 
let themselves become a vehicle that deprives people of 
the tools they need to protect themselves.198 
Ask yourself whether you would be willing to put a sign on your 
house stating, “This home is a gun-free zone”199—especially if 
you lived in the inner city. 
Several African-American leaders recognize, moreover, the 
need for inner city communities to arm themselves. Professor 
Cottrol reminds us that late-nineteenth to early-twentieth century 
state gun control laws were aimed specifically at keeping guns 
away from ex-slaves, other blacks, and recent immigrants.200 
                                                          
lence or Pandemic of Propaganda?, 62 TENN. L. REV. 513, 584-96; see 
generally David B. Kopel, Lawyers, Guns, and Burglars, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 
345 (2001). 
198 Kopel and Gardiner, supra note 65, at 747-48. 
199 John R. Lott, Jr., draft of an open letter to members of Congress, June 
3, 1999. 
200 Id. 
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Cottrol, a self-described Hubert Humphrey Democrat, also writes 
that “[b]ans on firearms ownership in public housing, the con-
stant effort to ban pistols poor people can afford—scornfully la-
beled ‘Saturday Night Specials’ and more recently ‘junk guns’—
are denying the means of self-defense to entire communities in a 
failed attempt to disarm criminal predators.”201 
Similarly, Gregory Kane, an African-American columnist for 
the Baltimore Sun further acknowledges that “[t]he NAACP 
should be assuring that every law-abiding citizen in America’s 
black communities has a safe, affordable handgun. . . . These 
young men are smart enough to know that the combined forces of 
city and state governments, Bill Clinton, the police, the NAACP, 
and the outrage of gun controllers won’t protect them.”202 Civil 
rights activist Charles Evers was even more blunt: “I put my 
trust in God and my .45 . . . and not always in that order.”203 
One would have thought that, before filing their lawsuits, 
federal, state and local governments would have examined the 
historical record. In 1967, a thirteen-year-old could buy a rifle 
from most hardware stores or even through the mail. Very few 
states had retail age restrictions for handguns. Until 1969, most 
New York City high schools had shooting clubs; students regu-
larly competed in shooting contests, and the federal government 
paid for rifles and ammunition.204 Federal and state gun laws to-
day are far more restrictive than they were three decades ago.205 
                                                          
201 Robert L. Cottrol, A Liberal Democrat’s Lament: Gun Control Is Rac-
ist, Sexist & Classist, AM. ENTER., Sept.-Oct. 1999, at 58-60. 
202 Gregory P. Kane, NAACP Gets Good, Bad Marks, RICH. TIMES-
DISPATCH, Aug. 15, 1999, at F3. 
203 Id. 
204 See John R. Lott, Jr., More Gun Controls? They Haven’t Worked in 
the Past, WALL ST. J., June 17, 1999, at A26 [hereinafter Lott, More Gun 
Controls?]. 
205 See Alana Bassin, Why Packing a Pistol Perpetuates Patriarchy, 8 
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 351, 361 (1997) (chronicling federal gun control 
since 1934); Philip J. Cook & James A. Leitzel, Perversity, Futility, Jeop-
ardy: An Economic Analysis on Gun Control, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
91, 93-94 (1996) (describing how the Brady Law substantially increased fed-
eral regulation of guns since the Gun Control Act of 1968). 
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Yet, until the 1990s, the creation of laws went hand in hand with 
an explosion of violent crime. 
While gun ownership rates were constant through the 1960s 
and 1970s, the rate of violent crime skyrocketed. With ownership 
rates growing during the 1990s, we have seen dramatic reduc-
tions in crime.206 Recent statistics from the U.S. Bureau of Jus-
tice show that gun deaths and injuries declined by 33% from 
1993 through 1997, with the decline continuing in 1998.207 Dur-
ing the same period of time, the number of circulating guns in the 
U.S. grew by 10%.208 In short, despite misleading reports from 
the media, there is no evidence to suggest that gun ownership and 
violent crime are directly linked. 
For the five years ended 1997, the Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention (“CDC”) reported a 21% decrease in violent 
crime, 21% decrease in gun-related deaths, and 41% decrease in 
non-fatal gun injuries.209 Gun deaths and overall homicides 
reached their lowest level in more than thirty years.210 Some ex-
perts cite tougher gun control and safety courses, but that does 
not explain why all violent crime decreased by the same percent-
age as gun-related crime.211 The likely reasons for the parallel 
decline are more vigorous enforcement, a booming economy, a 
waning crack trade, and an aging population. 
The CDC also reports that violent behavior by adolescents is 
on the wane, despite Columbine and other high-profile school in-
                                                          
206 See Lott, More Gun Controls?, supra note 204, at A26. 
207 See Gary Fields, Gun Conundrum: More on Streets, Fewer Incidents, 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2000, at B1 [hereinafter Fields, Gun Conundrum]. 
208 See Fields, Gun Conundrum, supra note 207, at B1. 
209 See Vanessa O’Connell & Paul M. Barrett, Bill to Ban Police from 
Gun Trade-Ins for Discounts Is Introduced in Congress, WALL ST. J., Nov. 
19, 1999, at A10. 
210 See James Pilcher, Gun-Related Death Rate Plummets, A.P., Nov. 19, 
1999. 
211 See John R. Lott, Jr., The Concealed-Handgun Debate, 27 J. LEGAL 
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cidents.212 That decline has been confirmed by data from the U.S. 
Department of Education indicating that expulsions for bringing 
firearms to school during the academic year 1997-98 were one-
third less than the prior year.213 Out of more than 32,000 gun-
related deaths, only 630 were kids under fifteen. Of those, 142 
were accidental.214 Predictably, that good news was met by an 
outcry from the Washington Post: Safety locks will “reduce this 
country’s horrifying accidental-gun-death rate of children under 
15.”215 
While some may find those statistics horrifying, more kids 
under fifteen are killed by bikes, swimming pools and cigarette 
lighters than by gun accidents.216 Will our city mayors be pursu-
ing each of those industries? If gun manufacturers are responsible 
for violence, why not the makers of the steel used in the guns? 
Indeed, when an Ohio appellate judge upheld the dismissal of 
Cincinnati’s gun suit in August 2000, he wrote the following: 
“Were we to decide otherwise, we would open a Pandora’s box. 
The city could sue the manufacturers of matches for arson, or 
automobile manufacturers for traffic accidents, or breweries for 
drunken driving.”217 
If anything, the case for holding car makers liable for drunk 
driving accidents is stronger than the case for charging gun mak-
ers for gun-related injuries. “In contrast to gun dealers, automo-
bile [manufacturers] make no effort at all to ensure that the buyer 
is not a criminal. Nor do automobile manufacturers require that 
their dealers take even minimal steps to check if a prospective 
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automobile purchaser has recent convictions for drunk or reckless 
driving, or even for vehicular homicide.”218 Moreover, “automo-
bile manufacturers have much more ability than gun manufactur-
ers to control dealer behavior, since most automobile manufac-
turers have exclusive, direct relationships with dealers. In 
contrast, the majority of gun dealers purchase inventory from 
wholesalers” without any reliable means to track retail pur-
chases.219 
CONCLUSION 
Before we compromise the Constitution, undermining the 
principles of federalism and separation of powers, and violating 
rights recognized expressly in the Second Amendment and im-
plicitly in the Ninth, we ought to be sure of three things: First, 
that we’ve identified the real problem; second, that we have pin-
pointed its cause; and third, that our fix is less intrusive than al-
ternative fixes. The spreading litigation against gun makers fails 
all three tests. Guns do not increase violence—they reduce vio-
lence. Banning or regulating firearms will not eliminate the un-
derlying social pathologies that cause violence. Moreover, a less 
intrusive remedy already exists—the enforcement of existing 
laws. 
There is a lesson to be learned from all of this. If nothing is 
done to rein in baseless, government-sponsored lawsuits, private 
attorneys and their accomplices in the public sector will continue 
to invent legal theories to exact tribute from friendless industries. 
In the latest rounds of litigation, law-abiding gun manufacturers 
may be forced to pay for the actions of criminals. That outcome 
will likely entice politicians unwilling to make tough choices and 
will enrich trial lawyers. There can be no pretense, however, that 
litigation of that sort has any basis at all in the rule of law. 
The American public—especially voters and jurors—must be 
warned that our tort system is rapidly becoming a tool for extor-
tion by a coterie of politicians and trial lawyers. Sometimes they 
                                                          
218 Kopel & Gardiner, supra note 65, at 763. 
219 Id. 
LEVYMACRO2-20.DOC 2/22/02 4:26 PM 
 BASELESS GUN LAWSUITS 49 
seek money; sometimes they pursue policy goals; often they 
abuse their power. Take it from former labor secretary, Robert 
Reich, certainly not renowned for his opposition to imperious 
government. Reich tells us that his ex-boss in the White House, 
President Clinton, launched “lawsuits to succeed where legisla-
tion failed.”220 “The strategy may work,” Reich adds, “but at the 
cost of making our frail democracy even weaker. . . . This is 
nothing short of faux legislation, which sacrifices democracy to 
the discretion of administration officials operating in utter se-
crecy.”221 
Reich has it just about right. But the problem outlives the 
Clinton White House. It infests many of the state houses and city 
halls. Like most infestations, this one can be fumigated. When 
we condone the selective and retroactive application of extraordi-
nary legal principles—intended specifically to transfer resources 
from disfavored defendants to favored plaintiffs, or even worse, 
to the public sector—we substitute political cronyism for funda-
mental fairness, profane the rule of law and debase personal 
freedom. 
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